The MARINE CORPS GALETTE

This Month's Cover

THE KAMIKAZE AT OKINAWA were the first serious threat to the U. S. Navy since the Battle of Surigao Straits. Here marines in a 40mm gun tub meet the threat of a Jap torpedo bomber coming in with suicidal intentions. The cover is by TSgt John De Grasse, his first for the GAZETTE in over a year.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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
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A LOT OF GROWING TO DO


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IT & T COMMUNICATIONS


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Passing in Review

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

Occupation Duty . . .

THE STAINLESS STEEL KIMONO—Elliott Chaze. 207 pages. New York: Simon and Schuster. \$2.75

The Stainless Steel Kimono struck this reviewer as the funniest book about soldiers since a post-World War I series by Leonard H. Nason. Nason's stories were built around a couple of ambulance drivers named Wally and Rouge who were rough-and-ready characters but, as I recall, essentially wholesome boys at heart. Mr Chaze, on the other hand, is fashionably aware of such things as neuroses and motivations in his build-up of the seven paratroopers in his book, and this is perhaps significant, or at least is a more accurate approach. In any case, Nason and Chaze are equally effective in reducing this reader to mirthful tears.

Chaze's seven had finished the conscientiously rugged training at Ft Benning shortly after the Japanese surrender had taken most of the zest out of the whole thing. Sent to Japan as occupation troops, they live together and share the little things that happen to them individually and jointly. In various combinations, they get in and out of trouble, follow their respective bents, and adjust themselves about as well as Americans ever adjust themselves in a foreign land. In the end, they break even, or roughly so.

There's no story line, just a series of episodes; but these, as I have indicated, are uniformly hilarious. There's the case of Wilson, who suffers from an occupational ailment incident to excessive letter writing in the latrine. Wilson's wife is given to plum-colored ink and Lloyd C. Douglas, and, during Wilson's absence, develops a great compassion for people who are "sullen and confused"-even to the extent of lending one such person fifty dollars of Wilson's allotment. Wilson, learning this, writes her in a magnificent rage, as follows: "When you start helping people with my fifty dollars you are going to tell me how and I don't give a God damn if it takes all the good out of it or not. I don't know anything about being sullen and confused but I know it isn't worth fifty dollars or every SOB would go around being sullen and confused. At that price I myself would be willing to make a career of it."

At random, you can get a laugh out of the girl with

the eloquent feet, the ski resort, Madame Buttercup (who combed her hair so that it looked like the seat of a motorcycle), or the chase through the paper walls of the house of low reputation, or practically any page you turn up.

Chaze, at one point, compares a typewriter to a punch-board: all the winning punches are there on the key-board, and all you have to do is punch the right ones, package them into a book, and win a good fat life. For this reviewer's money, Stainless Steel Kimono is a package of winning punches.

Single Shot Marksmen . . .

THE MUZZLE LOADING CAP LOCK RIFLE — Ned H. Roberts. 301 pages, 204 illustrations. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. \$7.50

Through the many years since it became technically obsolete, the muzzle-loading rifle has been generally regarded as nothing more than a relic to be displayed over a fireplace, or in an arms collection. However, there have been always during this period some individuals who, for sheer pleasure in achieving results with antiquated implements, actually have burned enough powder in the old rifles to keep alive the spark of active interest in this type of weapon which, above all other mechanical factors, was responsible for winning the American Wilderness.

Within the last decade or so, there has grown a surprisingly large coterie of these muzzle-loading rifle shooters; they have a national organization with thousands of members, and hold regular matches—restricted, of course, to muzzle-loading arms.

It is fortunate for all addicts, and potential addicts, of this persuasion that a dyed-in-the-wool, old time muzzle-loading rifleman with the most superior qualifications has come forth to supply them with a manual of broad and definitive coverage of his subject—the muzzle-loading cap lock (percussion) rifle. Ned H. Roberts, now an octogenarian, began shooting such arms at targets and at varied game while they were still well ahead of all the existent metallic cartridge rifles in accuracy at most ranges—possibly even away out at 1,000 yards. Also,

they were demonstrably more deadly on game, shot for shot, than the fixed-ammo rifles of the early 1870's.

This book, literally the Voice of Experience for the ever-increasing clan of muzzle-loading riflemen, is written for the people who cherish the old pieces as shooting irons, rather than as collectors' items or mantel draperies. However, the mere collector can derive much enlightenment about many rare rifles just from looking at the fine array of illustrations in this volume.

Roberts, in his preface, disclaims any attempt to tell all about his subject, or to instruct the seasoned muzzle-rifle shooter. However, though his material does somewhat ramble and occasionally equivocate, it would be difficult even for us who have had much to do with the firing and conditioning of the old rifles to name any very useful or interesting information which has been left out of this work.

In brief, Ned Roberts' book is the Alpha and Omega of knowledge for today's muzzle-loading rifle shooter and/or fancier. A fair marksman, with a good specimen of the cap-lock muzzle-loader—either hunting or target type—can soon learn, by the Roberts rules, to realize the amazing accuracy of this obsolete arm. A good mechanic with modest equipment could actually make a complete muzzle-loading cap lock rifle by study of the

working details and drawings in this book.

Aside from the more or less technical matter, the author has included some delightfully matter-of-fact reminiscences of his New England boyhood as a budding gun bug, and as a successful hunter of big game with muzzle-loading rifles.

This book is the third edition of Roberts' original privately printed work, circa 1940. The new volume is of fine, large format, much more attractive in appearance, and more comprehensive in text and illustrations than the first and second editions.

As for the author, Ned H. Roberts should require no introduction to American riflemen, new or pioneer style. Besides his vast experience with the old timers, he has kept up with the current trends in high-velocity, superaccurate rifles and cartridges. His study and experiments along modern lines have evolved several contributions to rifle ballistic engineering—notably, the .257 Roberts cartridge so highly esteemed today by precisionists in the shooting of sundry mammals, from prairie dogs to deer—and even bigger game.

By virtue of his long National Guard service, Ned Roberts could be properly addressed as Major; but, among the clan of muzzle-loading riflemen, he should be thought of as Pappy.

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What My Grammar School Taught Me

JOHNNY WAS AS WELL-DISCIPLINED A YOUNGSTER as you ever saw and always sought to treat his parents with a great deal of respect, which was as it should be. For example, when he thought his father might like his bedroom slippers after a hard day, he wouldn't ask the old man, "Hey, pop, wouldja like your bedroom slippers?" Instead he would inquire, "Would my father care for his bedroom slippers?"

When Johnny did that, pop would always look around in confusion to see who the hell the kid was talking to. Poor dad finally came to the conclusion that Johnny was a nice boy, but a little dense in mastering the grammatical principles of case and person.

As Johnny grew up he went to school, and while his marks were average or better, his teacher never could correct his tendency to address her as though he were talking to somebody else. When bringing her an apple, for instance, he might tell her, "Here is an apple for the teacher."

And when he grew older the girl he loved best nearly died of a broken heart before she eventually renounced all worldly desires to become a nun. It was all right until the night he took her on a moonlight ride. All seemed well until he turned to her with a deep and purple passion, "Would my girl friend marry me?" The poor girl didn't realize he was proposing to her, thinking he was asking her opinion as to his status with some other dame—probably that frowzy blonde that was always making eyes at him.

Then Johnny got a job, and there was reason to believe that he might get ahead. That is until he asked the boss one day, "What would the boss like to have me do today?" The boss turned on him like an angry panther and said, "Dammit, I'm your boss, and you're fired." Poor Johnny, he didn't know that on that very morning his boss, a kind of subforeman approximately equal to a second lieutenant, had had an argument with another subforeman as to which one was running the department (approximately equal to a platoon).

So Johnny's life was pretty much of a mess until he finally joined the Marine Corps. There his success was assured from the moment he was heard to tell his commanding officer, "Here is the book the captain requested." Johnny had found his niche and may make corporal any day now, for he had discovered the only place where an individual who addresses another in the third person is being respectful instead of a fool.

Why this outright violation of the rules of grammar has persisted in the military service under the guise of a mark of courtesy is beyond understanding, but a nation whose people are smart enough to develop the atomic bomb should be intelligent enough to correct its grammar—even in the service. The latest Marine Corps Schools text* on military courtesy concedes that it is not necessary to address an officer in the third person, but leaves the impression that it is desirable.

THERE IS NO LOSS of courtesy in speaking in preferred grammatical style. In private business, the lowly office clerk who wants to talk to the president about a raise shakes in his boots and hence strives for politeness just as much as the private asking the commanding officer for special liberty. The clerk is being just as respectful when he says, "Mr Smith, may I speak to you for a moment?" as the private who says, "Pvt Joe Blow requests permission to speak to the major." In my opinion, probably shared by scores of us who are really just civilians whom the war brought into the service and by many regulars as well, Pvt Blow would get as much attention should he say, "Maj Smith, may I see you? I'm Pvt Joe Blow."

Fie upon those who hold that the "GI" method of address is more concise and serves to identify the speaker. There are 10 words in each form (count 'em), and identification is accomplished equally well in the second.

Even more ludicrous is the twice-wrong query taken from the previously mentioned MCS text: "Does the captain wish to see the first sergeant?" and the alternative "Do you wish to see the first sergeant?" In such a situation surely no self-identification is necessary because everyone, even a captain, knows the company first sergeant. Why not simply: "Did you wish to see me, Captain?"

For my part, whenever anyone used to tell me, "The lieutenant is wanted on the phone," I was always tempted to reply, "Okay, I'll tell him when he comes in."

2dLt Emanuel Diehl

^{*}Basic Indoctrination (Quantico: Marine Corps Schools, 1947), page 33.

THE MARINE CORPS

THE PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

GAZETTE

APRIL 1948

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This Month and Next

- Where Do We Go From Here? by LTCOL ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, JR, in the May issue examines some of the tactical and technical problems confronting the FMF in the event of a future war.
- Of interest to both the administratively literate and illiterate is *The New Service Record Book*. After 31 years service the old SRB is being retired in favor of a much improved and modernized record book. The exposition on the new book is by Capts Joseph J. Reardon and Philip N. Pierce.
- ♣ Bertram Vogel brings us one of his characteristically colorful reconstructions of the war as seen through Japanese eyes in The Last Days of the Yamato.
- The Air Force Today is a picture story of the Air Force's planes, operational and experimental.
- * Resume of the NROTC by CAPT JULES M. ROUSE will bring our readers up to date on the Navy's college training program for future Navy and Marine officers.

The Thin Line

re of Tradition-II

By LtCol John Corbin

ABOUT A YEAR AGO, I CONTRIBUTED TO THE Gazette an article bearing the same title as this. At the time—and indeed, now—I hardly knew what I was writing. I knew only that there were things I wanted to say—observations which I thought should be made about changes then taking place beneath our eyes in the familiar fabric of the Marine Corps.

Tradition, I knew, was important to the Marine Corps—much more important than to the Army or even the

Navy. Tradition, as I thought things through, is one of the main props of élite troops (which the Marine Corps surely is, call us what you will), just as the sense of differentiation from other units which tradition begets is one of the prime factors in creating the élite spirit. Nevertheless, as I looked at the contemporary Marine Corps, all I could see were the corpses of murdered or moribund traditions, most of which had gone to the boneyard simply because no one had bothered to think or act for their protection or conservation. The least I could do, I thought, was to take inventory of the changes, to survey a few specimen fields of Marine Corps life, to take specific account of what was happening to our traditions, and in some cases, why.

That is also the objective of this article. As in the former one, I have grouped the traditions or past practices into approximately similar fields, and it is to them that we now turn.

OVER THE YEARS the Marine Corps has developed set ways of carrying on its daily business. In some in-


stances, these procedures like the familiar one of Office Hours, for example — have become almost ritualistic. But

here are several which, in the very recent past, have changed materially:

The ship's bell. Time was, in the old Marine Corps, that no post or station was complete without its ship's bell. This was not only a means of telling the time and of sounding alarms (such as fire-drill), but it was also a shining testimony to the elbow-grease and brightwork-polishing of countless generations of field-musics, to whose custody the Post Bell was usually assigned. As late as 1940, one Marine battalion, encamped under semi-permanent field conditions could seek and obtain—without so much as a raised eyebrow from Marine Corps Headquarters—a ship's bell, in order that the camp might be proper in all respects.\(^1\) This is hardly the case now, when existing bells on many present-day posts go unshined and unstruck, and hardly one marine out of twenty can tell time by the bells.

Etiquette of the company office. In the old days, the days of the first sergeant who in the words of the Marine Corps Manual was "in fact as well as in name, the first sergeant," there existed a precise way in which individuals entered and conducted themselves across the threshold of a company office. This involved (1) a knock, delivered not too loudly, by the one seeking to enter; (2) a pause while the first sergeant, the clerk, or any other individual privileged within the sanctum, went on with his business and the suppliant waited—at attention; (3) an order to enter, at which time the victim (as he usually began to imagine himself) carefully uncovered, advanced to state his business with maximum briefness, and held himself respectfully while deity answered. That

was how it went, then, in a properly regulated company; but you would never know it now, either from the clerkly smoothness




'This was the 4th Defense Battalion FMF (Maj G. F. Good, Jr.), in camp on Hilton Head Island, S. C., during the winter of 1940.

of the new-style first sergeants or the chatty nonchalance of those who stroll in and out of the office, which is no longer, in any sense of the word, a sanctum, quite literally a holy place.

Ritual of the sword. Although the Marine sword has been partially restored to use since its wartime nadir (when we were officially advised to contribute our swords to the neighborhood scrap-metal drive) this symbolfor symbol it was-has not yet regained its accustomed daily place. In fact the carrying of the sword is restricted to occasions when blues are worn, which is necessarily only a small part of the time. Less than ten years ago, however, the sword was normally worn with troops under arms (except for field exercises), as the pistol is now carried. The officer-of-the-day could be discerned from afar by his gleaming sword, as could any officer reporting for duty at a new station. When an officer misbehaved (also a tradition of some venerability), it was his sword which he surrendered upon receiving five days' hack. The sword was the symbol of authority and of comno more sentinels on watch than the civilian watchmen who doze or slouch about a supply depot.

NOTHING DISTINGUISHED the prewar Marine Corps so much as its uniforms and their soldierly wearing. The uniforms were good, undeniably so; but the strict protocol of their wearing, and the maintenance which they received, contributed as much to the Corps' deserved reputation in this field as did handsome military design. And vet. . . .

Headgear. As late as 1939, at least three active Circular Letters (ancestors of the Letter of Instruction) dealt with the question of what types of authorized headgear would be worn under what circumstances and by whom. This meant, concisely, that you were as much out of uniform wearing a barracks cap in a garrison-cap post or organization as if you had sauntered aboard minus your trousers. All Fleet Marine Force units, for example, wore the garrison cap; post troops wore the barracks cap (which is probably where the term originated); and



mand, not merely a trapping to be hung onto a suit of

Tour of guard duty. Few official rituals within the Corps enjoy more venerable sanction and long standing than the daily routine of a tour on guard. The mounting of the guard, the routine inspections, the posting of reliefs, the special ritual of the Number One Post in front of the Guardhouse—all these major procedures, plus many minor ones, going even down to the precise wording of entries in the guardbook, have come down little changed since the Civil War and before. Yet today, how many posts mount formal guard more than once a week? How many reliefs—even within easy march of the Guardhouse-are posted formally, or indeed, how many marines now know how to post a relief? If there is a spicand-span Number One Post being maintained by a single guardhouse in the Marine Corps, where is it? How many sentries walk their posts with rifles?2 These are familiar aspects of an ordinary tour on guard to most marines with more than eight years' service, but where are they now? Our guards, posted half-asleep from trucks, are

so on. Nowadays, even under the very portals of Marine Corps Headquarters, let alone Quantico or any place less exalted, the headgear is just what the individual happens to grab as he goes to work, or what his wife thinks is suitable to his style of beauty. Uniformity is one of the first steps toward smartness, and uniformity in headgear is one thing we ain't got.

And then there is the matter of the new enlisted barracks-caps—the ones with the broad grommets which keep the cap looking the way recruits' caps used to look in old times before they had been shaped to the true Marine scoop and flare. True it is that the old cap produced occasional zooty excesses, but the average marine prized its salty rake—and he knew, when wearing it, that nobody would mistake him, a marine, for a member of the Transportation Corps, or the Mineplanter Service, or the Sanitary Corps, or the Detached Enlisted Men's List, or the Air Force.

Finally—and a new tradition at that, born of the past war-the camouflaged helmet-cover has become a Marine trademark. Nevertheless, in pictures of marines embarking for the Mediterranean, for the very shores of Tripoli, you could see the bald-headed gleam of helmets as naked of covers as any war correspondent's, field

²Even at the nonpareil Marine Barracks, 8th and Eye Streets. Washington, D. C., the main gate sentry no longer stands watch with rifle and fixed bayonet as he did for so many years to the covert delight of passers-by and small boys.

director's, or soldier's. Even the jailhouse-cut raider caps would have been more traditional and appropriate to the occasion.

Uniform and chow-formations. The place is any Marine Barracks; the scene, before a mess-hall; the time, 1938. Marines are gathered before the door, the OD stands outside, the lowly field music at hand. The troops are shaven, scrubbed, wearing field-scarves, and all in the uniform of the day. Flash that scene up to 1948. The barracks are the same; the OD and the music are still there (only the latter is now—officially—a faceless SSN 803). But look at the troops—look at the dungarees, look at the unbuttoned jackets, look at the eased field-scarves, look at the non-regulation articles of clothing. Doesn't the comparison suggest something. . . . A dead tradition perhaps?

Clothing allowance. One of the principal reasons, over the years, why marines had that snappy look, and why their uniforms were habitually well cared-for, was the clothing allowance. This benign system allowed every marine a periodic balance in terms of the money-value of clothing issued for his use. If he wasted clothing and over-drew his account, he paid the difference out of his pocket. Where he could, he was careful to survey items and obtain credit, rather than dump them into a GI can. If he took proper care, the system allowed him a modest profit. When shipping-over time rolled around, he could cash in that profit, just as if he had been keeping a savings account. Under present ground-rules, however, there is no such profit motive in the clothing game, and the marines of today find it more convenient to overdraw and throw away than to patch and darn.

Pockets. If there is one tradition deader than that which used to interdict whistling aboard ship or about a shore station, it is the idea that pockets were meant to keep your hands out of. Illogically enough, this was a good tradition and was observed very strictly until quite recent times. There is at least one living major general (retired), who made it, in fact, his standing procedure to have the post tailor stitch up the side pockets of enlisted men (or officers) whom he detected in this unmilitary posture. Along with the change to more relaxed habits in this respect is the related one which lets you carry things in a pocket, a practice which somewhat modifies the pristine shape and cut of a blouse or a pair of trousers. This trend, of course, has been much encouraged by inclusion of hip pockets in issue trousers, another breach with the past.

F IF ANY SINGLE TRADITION of the Marine Corps is priceless, it is that of discipline and its corollary, leadership. Both, of course, are essentially inward matters, springing from intangibles too well-known and too numerous to relate. Nevertheless, like sacraments of the Church—which are also spiritual in nature—discipline



and leadership within the Marine Corps must be accompanied by "outward and visible signs," and discipline usually crumbles without its outer coating.

The modern PFC provides a good starting-point for searchers of changed disciplinary tradition. Less than a decade ago, the private first class was, in terms of responsibility, selection and character, what the rank originally had been entitled—a lance corporal; that is, a sort of apprentice noncommissioned officer. Nowadays, if he is anything more than a private with six months and good behavior behind him, the PFC is what the Japanese would style, a superior private. Thus by opening the rank to all hands not affirmatively disqualified, we have deprived it of its authority and its desirability just as we have inflated the private's pay up to a point at which that first chevron carries a 6 2/3 per cent payraise (\$75/\$80) rather than a 75 per cent raise (\$36/\$20.80). Who wants to be a PFC now? And what good is the rank to the Marine Corps?

The position of the soldier, commonly called, Attention, is less seen of late. The undersigned can remember without strain the days when a lieutenant passing down a hallway would be greeted by barks and bellows of "Attention" which froze every marine in sight. By contrast, upon occasion in 1948, when a major ventured to sing out upon the unexpected entrance of no less a personage than the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, there were raised eyebrows and aggrieved looks from the more sensitive persons present. Then, too, it was once immutable law that troops marched at attention within the inhabitated confines of a post. Nowadays, it

seems, they don't even go places in formation, let alone at attention.

"To be effective," said a Wehrmacht manual, "punishment must be dramatized." Generally speaking, the traditional Marine methods of handling prisoners accomplished this end, even if nobody had ever read the Wehrmacht's training literature. For example, the prisoner of yesteryear underwent a very special haircut. Upon being addressed, instead of being privileged to stand, as a soldier, at attention, he was required to fold his arms in subservience. The purpose of these traditional rites (which have now been officially proscribed) was to make the man, and those about him, realize that punishment was in progress-to dramatize the status of the prisoner to his remorseful self and to his awed fellows. This was something like spanking a spaniel with a rolled up newspaper. The noise was the thing which dramatized the reasonable painless spanking, just as in the case of the prisoner, the folded arms and tonsure didn't really hurt the man.

THE FIELD OF MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATION, as one writer recently pointed out in an acid contribution to the Gazette, has been changing steadily (and for the worse, in his opinion) ever since the immediate prewar period. Insofar as fixed procedure amounts to tradition, then the changeover in this area has been staggering, what with IBM juggernauts crushing the Muster Roll Section, and Classification plunging gunnery sergeants, marine gunners, field musics, and all the other time-honored ratings into the

Lethean anonymity of the SSN.

Use of Letterhead Stationery. During the war, for no very apparent reason, the time-honored custom of using Marine Corps letterhead stationery declined to almost zero. Whereas in days past, it had been customary to write up all correspondence leaving the organization on this special paper, blazoned with the emblem of the Corps, it now became usual to head correspondence on simple bond paper with a typed inscription. Only in Marine Corps Headquarters, very properly the font of correct correspondence procedure, did the emblem continue to be used. It does not seem to have been killed off entirely, however, and a partial renascence of letterhead correspondence has taken place; but, like the sword, its return is only partial, and many commands, particularly those overseas, continue to originate their letters without benefit of the Marine Corps emblem, quite as if we either had no emblem, or that it really wasn't very important after all.

Army administrative jargon is creeping into the Marine Corps. Nowadays a man receives not a "warrant" when promoted, but an "appointment," as in the Army. Why? Just because inter-service uniformity seems, latterly, to have become an end in itself. Keyhole experts in on the current revision of the Marine Corps Manual (which needs revision, Lord knows) report that we are in the process of going overboard for virtually every Army administrative term, blank form and procedure—probably so that an ultimate merger will be easier on the administrative factotums.

The vanishing first sergeant seems about ready to complete his sad decline by total disappearance. Even as the official title of his rating has now been scratched from the books, so his function, we hear, may shortly be allocated to a vague being to be styled, in our fast-encroaching IBM-lingo, "the administrative chief"—think of it! Take a long look at your first sergeant; you may never see him again.

THERE ARE FEW FIELDS which demand a more pragmatic and practical approach than that of training, and, correspondingly, in which obsolete sentimental considerations find less justification. Nevertheless, even in

this hard-boiled sphere, a few of the traditional Marine ways have gone by the board when they might well have been spared.

Weapons requalification for officers is a good example. Prior to the past war, neither heaven nor hell nor principalities nor powers could excuse any officer below the age of 38 from firing annuallyand qualifying-with the two basic infantry small arms, the rifle and the pistol. What use was it, however, to have a desk-bound, oak-leaved staff officer getting himself sunburned and sore over a weapon which he would never have a chance to fire in anger? The answer is this. That annual fortnight on the range helped to undeskbind that pair of leaves, to bring him into closer psychological touch with the Marine rifleman whom he ultimately must be prepared to launch and lead into the



The Rising Tide of Administration,
Marine Corps Gazette, January 1948.

firing-line of combat. It helped, incidentally, to pare off an excess pound or two, to temper a few muscles and to sharpen the eye. But those considerations are apparently no longer important. Field officers, at a time when they have never been younger, on the average, can now hang the rifle on its peg over the fireplace and forget the days when the Marine Corps was a corps of riflemen and every Marine officer potentially an infantry leader.

Extra compensation for marksmanship, it seems, is also hanging on by its teeth and eyebrows. The Army has already taken a stand against extra pay for men who can excel as Expert Riflemen or Sharpshooters, and the Marine Corps is thus in a corner between the Navy, to whom the question is unimportant, and the Army, which seems satisfied with average performance. Until a very few years ago, however, it was still Marine doctrine that only the shots which hit, counted.

Basic infantry training. The very necessary emphasis of World War II upon military specialization seems materially to have altered the long-standing axiom that every marine, officer and man, must be, au fond, an infantryman. From a somewhat literal view, those who favor intensive specialization can make out a strong case for the position that it is absurdly wasteful to require every marine to have, in effect, two specialties, that is, infantry plus one other, or vice versa. Yet certain it is, in spite of A-bombs, bacteria, guided missiles, and anything else vet to be conceived, the infantryman at close quarters is still the man who decides the ultimate battle. All the array of specialties exists for but one proper end-to commit the rifleman to close ground combat under the most favorable conditions. Thus the Marine Corps held with good reason that, at the core of its élite body, must be its infantry; and that, regardless of the proven necessity of a whole host of peripheral specialists, every one of the latter must continually be projecting himself psychologically into the rifleman's battle. To achieve that end-and, incidentally, to provide for nasty unforseen contingencies when even specialists must be able to skirmish and handle a rifle—the doctrine was fostered and maintained that every marine, be he radar operator, laundryman, graves registration, artillery or aviation, must also be a basic infantryman. During the accelerated training of war, we could not find time for this dualization, but that does not mean that it is not desirable when we have the time, between wars. Wake, garrisoned by base-defense artillery and an aircraft squadron, is, as Gen Vandegrift has pointed out4, a prime example of highly specialized personnel "fighting courageously and well as basic infantry when the chips were down." The performance of those gunners and aviators was not something which happened miraculously

under strain, but rather the product of years of Marine Corps training and tradition. It is a tradition, however, to which we give lip-service only at present, and the specialists hold the field.

ALL THESE DEPARTURES from old ways must, under thoughtful analysis, add up to something. It is not enough to conclude, effortlessly, that change is the law of life, and that the Marine Corps, like any living organism, must change continually. There exists a certain pattern in the superficially rather disparate items which we have ticked off. This pattern, it seems to me, amounts in some sense to a blurring of the distinctiveness of the Marine Corps, to a continual sloughing off of the attributes which have made the Corps an entity and a law unto itself.

Without those traditional attributes, we may well ask, what is left of the Marine Corps? Wherein does it differ from any other semi-military armed herd? Further, indeed, unless the Corps remains something special, what use or justification is there for its separate existence?

Every thoughtful officer realizes that, under whatever label, a nation in arms requires élite troops. These must embody superior discipline, valor and aggressiveness. Perhaps the foremost means of developing these qualities is careful differentiation between the élite and the mass. This is accomplished largely by a symbolic means: differing uniforms, strict conformity to military traditions, unit slogans and jargon, etc., all of which constitute the very warp and woof of tradition. In perpetual opposition to these things, however, stands the concept of the mass army, whose goal is always the minimum and the passable average. To this body, traditions are of scant significance, because they assume importance only in connection with maintenance of standards beyond the established minimum. To the mass army, conformity and uniformity are of great desirability, whereas the unsystematic quirks sometimes imposed by tradition are merely excrescent inconveniences.

In a sense, therefore, the Marine Corps stands at a parting of the ways. It is big enough to pretend to be a small army, though truly it is not; or it may continue in past ways, adhere to traditions and remain distinct. Which path we take will not be the result of any single command decision or Marine Corps Headquarters study. Whether or not we cleave to our traditions and individuality, with all that that implies, will result from the actions and thinking of all marines.

If the Corps as a whole values its tradition as a Corps and a unique military institution, marines will attempt to foster, observe and defend those traditions, great or small. And perhaps, then, our generation of marines may be spared the substitution of Geronimo! for Semper Fidelis, as the byword of the élite.

^{&#}x27;Foreword to The Defense of Wake, the official Marine Corps Historical Section narrative of the operation.



Palestine policeman and British officer confer by body of Arab killed during attempted bank holdup.



Armored car and patrol car stand by to radio for aid as British pull night raid against terrorists.

Search Operations in Palestine

No description of the work of the soldier in a typical cordon and search operation in Palestine can alone give the reader a true idea of what the troops have to contend with in that country. To get a real picture one must have a general background of life in the country, the attitude of the native to the soldier and, most

important of all, the conditions under which the soldier lives.

Palestine under conditions prevailing over the last eighteen

months has been a country of suspicion: unlike the war, when one had one's periods of rest (normally amongst liberated peoples who were friendly), the soldier is always on duty and alert to the fact that, at any time, he may expect a murderous attack. In conditions where the moderate Jew will not cooperate with the

By Brigadier R. N. Anderson, DSO
Photos by David Douglas Duncan

Security Forces it is impossible to know who is friend or who is enemy. Such conditions lead to irksome, though most necessary, restrictions such as walking off duty armed and never alone. This is in good times, but there have been periods of weeks on end when troops have been confined to their camps except when

actually out on operations.

The soldier has no social life outside camp. He has little in common with the Arab; to the

Jew he is courteous, but suspicion is mutual. Such social life as he has, he has to make for himself, but even this becomes monotonous with the paucity of the female element since the families were evacuated. NAAFI Institutes with British female staffs are most popular, but such staffs are few and far between: the only other British women the soldier is likely to meet are the W.V.S., whose work

is so much appreciated.

What of the camps in which the soldier lives and which more than ever before he has to make his home? These were in the main built as training camps during the war, or as rest camps for formations withdrawn from Italy to train and refit for further battle. They are of a very temporary nature, consisting of hutted buildings for offices, messes, cookhouses and Institutes, but with all personnel living under canvas. Only recently has electric light been installed in the tents, a tremendous step forward, for now at least the soldier can read and

This timely article is reprinted from the British The Army Quarterly for January 1948. MajGen R. J. Collins, editor of the Quarterly, says that "no one knows more about that kind of nasty work than Brig Anderson."

The photographs are by *Life* Photographer David Douglas Duncan, whose wartime work as a Marine combat photographer will be remembered. These pictures were made available to the GAZETTE through the courtesy of Time, Inc.



Police continue search for terrorists on grounds of Orient Cinema which features American movie.

write his letters in the one place he can call his own.

Such essentials as fans and refrigerators for the hot weather are conspicuous only by their absence. Playing fields are generally speaking of the makeshift type, built by units themselves, and are few and far between.

Add to this the barbed wire complex, for all camps are surrounded by wire, and it will be appreciated that the soldier's home is difficult to make into a cheerful and comfortable place despite the ingenuity of commanding officers, to whom must be given the greatest praise for their successful efforts to maintain efficiency and, most important of all, promote happiness in their units.

One could write a complete paper on the subject of conditions alone: the enormously high cost of living which seldom permits the soldier to visit the towns; the difficulties of local leave, only Cyprus being popular; the paucity of live entertainments. But the object of this background is merely to put the reader in the right frame of mind to understand the outlook of the soldier when he is engaged on a big operation.

To carry this background one stage further, it seems important to give some idea of the general day-to-day tasks which the soldier has to perform in the normal course of duty. For it is into this picture that a major search operation falls and not as an isolated event in his life.

Normally units are allotted sectors within the boun-



Tommies work feverishly with pneumatic drills to rescue victims trapped in King David Hotel blast.

daries of which they are responsible for law and order. In order to maintain law and order constant patrolling both by day and night is necessary in order to give a feeling of insecurity to the "thug." Such patrols are to prevent the mining of railways, to check the verges of roads for mine leads and to dominate the villages from which the "thug" may work.

A further task designed to make life insecure for the dissidents is that of snap checks of vehicles, cafes and hotels in cooperation with the police. Also in the daily task are the guarding of vulnerable points and coast watching for illegal immigrant ships. Add to this the ever present commitment of guarding one's own camp and it will be realized that the soldier's day is a very full one. In fact, one may consider oneself lucky to be on duty only one night in three, and it is quite common to do night duty every other night for long periods.

On top of operational commitments there is the task of training the soldier for his normal duties in war—the range shooting, collective training, education; with the young soldier of to-day this is all important, and, despite the difficulties, a very high standard has been maintained, as is proved by results recently seen when the 1st Infantry Division was able to carry out brigade training for a short period in Transjordania.

Despite, therefore, the somewhat gloomy picture that has been painted of the conditions (and gloomy it is in

Tommies were awakened at midnight, hastily briefed as to the job at hand and were on their way to a village at three in the morning. Mine detectors were used to locate an arsenal of two ready-to-use land mines, pistols, and ammunition



Mine detectors helped the British to find hidden weapons during this search of a Jewish village.

fact), the background would not be a true one if it is not realized that the morale, efficiency and bearing of the soldier in Palestine is of the highest order.

EVENTS IN PALESTINE happen quickly. Unlike in the Arab troubles of 1937-38, the Security Forces are faced with a well-organized, well-armed and fanatical enemy in the dissident groups who oppose them. Acts of terrorism are carefully planned and swiftly carried out, and it is normally as a result of such an act that a major search is undertaken.

If action by the troops is to be of value a search has to be undertaken at very short notice. On one occasion a brigade commander gave verbal instructions to his commanding officers in his pyjamas at 1:30 a.m., and his staff, who had not been awakened, woke up the following morning to find the camp virtually deserted: the brigade had deployed before dawn and by 5 a.m. was placing a cordon round a Jewish village ten miles away!

The Jewish intelligence system is first-class, and, as a result of this, previous reconnaissance of a selected village is almost certain to give the show away. Telephones are most insecure and cannot be used for planning purposes. Natives are employed in all the camps, in the NAAFI canteen and as garrison engineer's labourers; it is thus most inadvisable to put anyone but those really essential into the picture until the last possible moment lest an incautious word may give the whole show away. It is thus common for the troops to be awakened at midnight (and most of them will have been on guard the previous night), hastily briefed as to the job on hand and be on their way to the scene of operations by 3 a.m. in order to cordon off the village before daylight. It is only alertness, good discipline and good



An air hammer is used by the British searchers to crack apartment landing where rifles were found.

leadership that makes this not only possible but relatively easy.

In view of the impossibility of ground reconnaissance, air photographs assume enormous importance, and these are invariably used in all planning for such operations. The Palestine Police, too, must be brought into the planning stage early, as, with their more intimate knowledge of the country, they are invaluable in providing guides to take the cordon troops quickly to the line selected so as to seal off the village.

Except in major searches and operations, such as the imposition of martial law in Tel Aviv, it is unusual for orders to be written, for this adds to the possibility of leakage of information. Village searches are usually carried out at dawn, the village having been surrounded during the hours of darkness to ensure that all inhabitants (and the Jew is an early riser) are present and have not left for work in the fields. The greatest difficulty is that of closing the cordon before the game is given away, and to achieve this, ingenuity in planning and speed in execution by the troops are of paramount importance.

To sum up, the essentials for planning a cordon and search operation are security in all stages; a simple plan which can be put into execution quickly in the dark; adequate reserves to deal with unforseen eventualities in the early stages.

The operation to be described is the search of a Jewish settlement of some 2,000 inhabitants and involves the use of the major part of an infantry brigade. The object of the search is twofold—primarily to look for wanted "thugs" and, of secondary importance, to search for illegal arms which may be hidden in the settlement.

Before describing the operation the reader should



British searchers locate hand grenades, pistols, and machine guns in raid on village in Palestine.

know the names given to the various groups of troops who will have been detailed to take part. These names will be used throughout this narrative. The following, therefore, are the types of parties which may be needed:

Cordon troops—troops required to surround the area to be searched so as to prevent those inside the cordon getting out.

Outer cordon troops—parties of troops placed at some distance from the village, sites at strategic points, to prevent the population of neighbouring villages interfering with the operation.

Cage troops—parties required to erect and guard the cages to which the inhabitants are brought for interrogation.

Escort troops—troops required at the cages to escort to the place of detention those wanted persons found as a result of interrogation.

Road blocks—may be required on roads leading to the village in order to divert traffic away from the scene of operations.

Search parties—consisting of troops and Palestine Police: these parties enter the village with the object of collecting the inhabitants and moving them to the cages and to search for arms.

Screening teams—parties of police who interrogate the inhabitants and who decide who are "wanted" persons.

Reserves—reserves must be maintained at all levels to deal with the unexpected.

Let us now imagine that an expert military observer has been hidden on the roof of the highest building of the village to be searched and listen to his running commentary on the operation!

"It is 3:45 a.m. and it will be dawn in three-quarters



Ordnance men examine ammunition for light machine guns and signal pistols found in raid on village.

of an hour. I can see columns of traffic approaching the village, one from the south and one from the west. The southern convoy has now reached the outskirts of the village, the vehicles are three-tonners. Troops are pouring out and doubling round the village to the west and east. The western convoy seems to consist of carriers—yes they have left the road and are dashing over the fields round the north-west side of the village. There seem to be troops all round the village except on the north-east side—wait a minute, yes, there are troops there, they must have come across country on foot and I hadn't noticed them before. Yes, the village is now completely surrounded.

"Only fifteen minutes now before it is light. I can see the glow of the sun below the hills. Streams of traffic are approaching the village and parking themselves outside the cordon.

"Now I can begin to see better. To the west and north I can see two parties of outer cordon troops who seem to have been placed between us here and two Jewish villages about a mile and half away. Below me and just outside the cordon I see men busy with barbed wire: they are building the cage; they also seem to be erecting tents; probably these are for the interrogators and to give shade to the women and children.

"Away to the right the search troops are forming up along the cordon ready to start entering the village when ordered to do so. There seem to be police with these search troops.

"A jeep is now entering the village escorted by an armoured car—yes, it contains the Brigadier and the Police Superintendent. They have stopped at the Mukhtar's* house and are going in. Two other jeeps with *Roughly equivalent to the Mayor.

loud-speakers have now entered the village; they are broadcasting to the population to remain in their houses and that the village is under curfew.

"I am now going down to the Mukhtar's house to see what is going on down there. Here we are—the Brigadier has just told the Mukhtar that he has reason to believe that the "thugs" who blew up the railway line yesterday came from this village and that troops and police are going to carry out a search. All inhabitants are to remain indoors until ordered to go to the cages for interrogation by the searching troops. The Brigadier has made it plain that the troops will be courteous provided orders are obeyed. Old persons and pregnant women will not be moved to the cages and will be left in their houses. He has asked the Mukhtar to provide reputable citizens to accompany each search party to see that no unnecessary damage is done. He has just told the Mukhtar that he himself may move about within the village at his will during the search and told him to assure the inhabitants that there is no cause for alarm. The Brigadier has now got into his jeep and is off back to his headquarters outside the cordon.

"I am now at Brigade H.Q. The Brigadier is interviewing three Jews. The first two are pressmen and he has allowed them to go where they please and has detailed an officer to accompany them. The third man has made a complaint that the telephones will not work and has been told that all lines from the village have been cut and that it is isolated from the outside world.

"The soldiers round about are 'brewing up,' an art which has not been completely lost out here in Palestine! "The Brigadier has just ordered the search to begin

Security duty in Palestine requires a fine type of soldier and offers little in the way of reward.



and the search troops are entering the village."

"I have now joined one of the search parties, which consists of a subaltern, an NCO, ten private soldiers and a Palestine policeman. An elder of the village has been attached to the party to watch proceedings.

"Their first task is to search a block of flats-the policeman, who is an interpreter, has gone inside covered by the soldiers and orders all inhabitants to come outside, where they are to be collected by an escort to remove them to the cage for interrogation. Now they are streaming out of the house. It is incredible the numbers that such a building can contain. The subaltern has shouted out of a window for two soldiers. They have gone upstairs to deal with a young woman of about eighteen years of age who has refused to move from her room-she is firmly taken by the soldiers by each arm and carried forcibly downstairs screaming. The house is now cleared and the inhabitants (the woman still screaming) are moved off to the cage under escort. The search party is now going through the house to see that nobody is left inside hiding. This is a long and laborious job and is being done with real thoroughness-wardrobes, cupboards, all are looked into. Walls are sounded for false caches. There is a noise from an outhouse in the back garden. What have they found? A young Jew covered with feathers has been found hiding in the henhouse. He is marched away to the cage with a special escort. Elderly persons and the children have not been taken away.

"Another search-party of sappers is at work in the garden with mine detectors. Interest is being shown at a concrete slab near the henhouse. They have now sent for a compressor and are picking away at the slab They have now dug down some three feet below the slab and are pulling out an oil drum: what does it contain? Yes, there is something in it all right; the contents are being laid out on the ground. Two landmines all ready for use, half a dozen pistols and two boxes of ammunition. The cache is now being photographed by an Army photographer. The search of this block of flats and garden is now complete. The cordon is being moved in, leaving the flats outside the cordoned area—this means that when the inhabitants have been interrogated at the cage and released they are free, but still cannot enter any part of the village which has not been searched. It will take the troops a good six hours to search this village thoroughly. Let us go and see what is happening at the cage."

BEFORE ALLOWING our commentator to describe what is happening at the cage the reader should know the layout. In fact, there are four cages. Two—one for males and the other for females—are the reception cages into which the inhabitants of the villages are taken by their escorts on arrival and where they await their turn for interrogation. From these reception cages there are



British-trained Camel Corps, predominantly Arab, patrols the vast Negeb desert country east of Suez.

wired-in passages leading to the interrogation tent in which the Palestine Police screening team works. On completion of the screening the inhabitants move straight into either the "wanted" persons cage or to a waiting-cage, where they wait until orders are given for them to return to the village.

Our commentator is now approaching the cage, so let us hear what he has to say:

"Small parties of inhabitants from the village are streaming across the open ground between the village and the cages; all are under escort. On arrival here they are split, the men being sent to a cage on my right and the women to one on my left. The men's cage is just an open rectangle surrounded by barbed wire, but the women have a tent to protect them from the sun, which later in the day will become very hot. Just outside the cages there is a medical officer with a first-aid post. An interpreter is present to answer the prisoners' queries, which are referred, when necessary, to the officer in charge of the cage. An orderly with buckets is doing a great trade providing drinking water from an Army water cart which is parked nearby. All round the cages soldiers with fixed bayonets stand on guard.

"One by one the inhabitants move into the interrogation tent and are screened by the Police C.I.D. On the table I see piles of records and photographs of wanted men. Every person has to produce his identity documents, and these are carefully checked with the records. Anyone whose identity card shows him as not being an inhabitant of the village is interrogated as to the reason for his spending the night there.

"Outside again I can see already a dozen people in the 'wanted' cage. A soldier has handed a loaf of bread over the wire to them—a young man has grabbed the loaf and hurled it back at him!



Troops herd illegal entries aboard wire-enclosed deck of *Empire Rival* for long trip back to Cyprus.

"An R.S.M. who is standing at the entrance to the cage is having a heated conversation with a Jew. What is it all about? The Jew claims that as he is a Rabbi he should not be put into the cage, the R.S.M. told him politely, but firmly, that everyone is to go into the cage. The argument still continues. The R.S.M. has taken the man by the arm and led him into the cage."

And so the search drags on—a slow, dull and tiring business, but one which must be done with thoroughness to the bitter end. Not always are searches as peaceful as the one described: sometimes the younger inhabitants refuse "en masse" to go to the cages and have to be carried there forcibly; sometimes the soldiers are stoned; but generally speaking the Jew has now learned that whatever resistance he puts up, the soldier quietly and efficiently deals with the problem facing him and wins the day. This is done with minimum force, and as a result has little propaganda value, which is normally the object of any resistance.

Not until the screening is complete and the "wanted" men sent off under escort to their place of detention, where they are subjected to further interrogation, is the cordon lifted.

The Mukhtar is sent for by the Brigadier before troops move back to camp and is asked whether he has any complaints. He is asked to sign a certificate that no damage has been done. All soldiers are searched by their officers before leaving the scene of the operation, in order that future claims of looting may be refuted. As the last troops leave, the curfew is lifted and life in the village returns to normal.

Back in camp the soldier prepares himself for a continuance of normal routine—patrols must go on, and he will certainly be on guard duty of some sort within the next twenty-four hours!

Global Strategy in the Part



Paign in the Pacific in a couple of sentences. This may have appeared to American readers somewhat cavalier treatment of the subject. I should therefore explain that my summary dismissal of these operations was due partly to my feeling not fully qualified to expound such a subject, and partly because what I wrote had to be compressed into four lectures, each of one hour's duration. I therefore deliberately excluded all but the purely land aspects of the fighting. The Editor has since invited me to enlarge upon the subject of combined operations in the Pacific and the lessons that we may draw from them for the future. I will here endeavour to comply. Indeed, this article might almost be

There is no need to defend the procedure of examining the past war in order to prepare for a possible future one, for I profoundly agree with Adm Mahan's assertion, that the principles of war "are detected by the study of the past which reveals them in successes and failures, the same from age to age."

regarded as a fifth lecture on the general strategy of the war.

It is impossible to withhold a tribute of admiration for the beautiful planning exhibited by the Japanese at the outset of their war. Apart from the purely air attack on Pearl Harbor, there were no less than six separate and simultaneous taskforces on the sea and en route for their destinations when the felon blow was struck at Pearl Harbor. These destinations were, of course, Midway Island, Guam, Gilbert Islands, Luzon, Malaya and Hong Kong. (It is reasonable to suppose that the first three were based on Truk Island and the last three on Formosa.)

^{*}Influence of Sea Power Upon History.

affic War



All six achieved their object.

In her subsequent operations Japan seems to have worked by a succession of "waves." This is not surprising, for the great majority of her troop-carrying ships must have been employed in the opening operation and would have to return to port to be reloaded; thus a fortnight at least might be expected to intervene between each wave. This is approximately what happened. A series of four of these waves can be descried between December 9th and the end of February. The first wave has been already mentioned. The objectives of the second were Borneo, Wake Island and Celebes. The third: Amboyna, New Guinea, Rabaul, and the Solomons. The fourth: Sumatra, Bali, Timor, and Java.

Thus by the end of February Japan had formed a vast semicircle of conquests, and had almost achieved her object. Almost, but not quite. In order to safeguard her flanks she required the Andaman Islands on her right flank, and the Aleutians on her left. Both these were acquired by two expeditions in March and June respectively. But even so she was not satisfied. (I am leaving out of account for the moment her continental aspirations, viz, in China, Burma, and possibly India.) In order to secure herself from all fear of combined attack from the U.S.A. and the British Empire it was necessary to drive a wedge between the two. Thus the New Hebrides and Eastern Australia must be acquired. This I think explains the determined and repeated attempts to enlarge her conquests in the Solomons and beyond, in the ensuing months. This brought about some of the bitterest and at the same time the most interesting fighting of the whole campaign. It also marks the turning point of the war in the Pacific. But before dealing with it let us stop for a moment to review Japan's strategy in the opening moves.

WHETHER SHE LIKED IT or not, Japan found her strategy conditioned by geographical considerations. No one can alter geography to suit his own taste or requirements. Japan found herself willy-nilly between three enemies. Britain to the southwest, Holland to the south, and the U.S.A. to the east. In other words she was bound to operate on interior lines. By theoretical reasoning it is difficult for a country acting on interior lines to force a decision, the chief reason being that the further you push your enemy back, the more difficult it is to surround and destroy him. How then are we to account for the fact that Japan had succeeded almost everywhere in obtaining a decision? As I have described it elsewhere, you require a walled or roped-in space like a boxing ring in such a case to prevent your enemy jumping out of the ring and saving his skin. Now in the places where Japan gained her greatest successes there was such a "rope." It was provided by the sea (and, owing to Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, this occurred right away). There was practically no escape for her enemies, nor could one island go to the help of another. Japan could chew up her opponents on the various islands at her leisure. This she proceeded to do. But there were three quarters or theatres where she failed to obtain this decision; they were China, Burma and

It is difficult for a country operating on interior lines to force a decision on an enemy. Japan faced Britain to the southwest, Holland to the south and the U. S. A. to the east. The Japanese were unable to surround the Allies

New Guinea. The reason is obvious: two of them are not islands, and the third has such huge dimensions that it may almost be rated a continent. Thus results were in accord with theory.

But there is this paradoxical feature about such operations from an interior position, that the farther it is pursued the weaker and more perilous does your strategical situation become. For you are continually increasing the length of your perimeter. Unless you can guarantee making peace before your enemy has the chance to revert to the counterattack, your frontier, owing to its great extent, will absorb a considerable proportion of your armed forces to garrison and defend it; the further you extend it the thinner will become your line of defence, and consequently the easier will it be for your adversary to penetrate when he returns to the attack. You will be like the frog in Æsop's fable, that blew itself out so much that it burst. That is just about what happened to Japan. She burst.

BUT THE COURSE of these operations brings out another very profound principle of war, the virtues inherent in the offensive. Textbooks sometimes make themselves slightly ridiculous by discussing at length whether one should adopt the offensive or defensive, for more often than not there is no option; the defensive may be forced upon one-as it was on the Allies in this case. Nevertheless, there are occasionally cases where a country has the option of taking the offensive and lives to regret that it did not do so. Such a case was that of France in 1939. In the case of Japan, the advantages inherent in the offensive are very evident. Generally speaking, the greater the extent of common frontier-or accessible frontier such as the sea provides—the greater are the inherent advantages of the offensive. A more striking example of this could not be imagined than that presented to Japan. By striking before the declaration of war the question of the command of the sea did not enter into the matter. Literally thousands of miles of frontier presented themselves to her. The "butter" of the Allies was spread over such a huge slice of bread that it was perilously thin everywhere. As Frederick the Great and Napoleon had pointed out (and as was reiterated in almost identical terms by Winston Churchill) "He who tries to defend everywhere is weak everywhere." The Allies tried to defend everywhere-indeed they had no option, the blow falling before they could alter their dispositions had they wished to-with the inevitable result that they were weak everywhere and thus fell an easy prey to the hostile attacks.

The turn of the tide is usually imperceptible. There is a period of "slack water" and only the keenest eye will detect the exact moment of the turn. In point of fact the turn of the tide in the Pacific War can be pin-pointed with some precision. Bear in mind the ultimate objective of the Japanese. In order to achieve it they made three attempts, one by sea, which was defeated in the battle of the Coral Sea, and two across the peninsula of New Guinea. The second of these was aimed at Port Moresby, and it got within 20 miles of it on September 15th, 1942. It there came to a halt. A dramatic pause of a fortnight ensued (slack water) and then the tide receded, the Australians pushing their opponents gradually back across the Owen Stanley Mountains to Buna. At Guadalcanal the Americans were attacking. On land the Japs had shot their bolt. On sea they still had a few shots in their locker, but the naval engagements of November off Guadalcanal sent their ships scurrying for the shelter of their ports—whence they did not emerge in strength till the battle of the Philippines almost two years later.

The interest of this period of "slack water" including the battle of Midway Island, is tactical rather than strategical, so I must regretfully pass it by and go on to consider Gen MacArthur's great plan for the strategic counteroffensive. (I personify the architect of this offensive by MacArthur as naturally I do not know to what extent the conception of the plan was his and to what extent that of the combined Chiefs of Staff. Anyway he was the executant.)

FOR MONTHS THE BATTLE surged on New Guinea and in the Solomons, and people began to look at their map wistfully and to calculate how many years at this rate of progress it would take to reach Japan.

The northern coast of New Guinea is well over 1000 miles long, roughly the same distance as from Alamein to Tunis. Now it had taken Montgomery, moving pretty fast by land all the way, over five months to get there. MacArthur, when he began his great advance along the coast of New Guinea in April 1944, covered the 400 miles to Hollandia in a few days. The explanation is of course simple—he had obtained the complete command of the sea, by which medium he sent his troops. Great pockets of Japanese were left hundreds of miles in rear, where they remained (if they did not die) till the end of the war, (another example of the wastefulness of troops in the defense). The hop of 400 miles had prevented the support of army fighters, so air support was provided by naval carriers. At infinitesimal loss, 50,000 Japs had been cut off and potentially removed from the war by a beautiful example of the co-operation of all three services. There were many such. Let this example of the capture of Hollandia serve as an example. It establishes for all time the great advantage of possessing a large number of aircraft carriers.

The pattern was becoming almost stereotyped. First, the bombing of the objective; then a naval bombardment combined with tactical bombing from carriers; then a landing; then the establishment of airfields on the island, and possibly the stepping up of naval bases. Then the

bombing of the next island selected for attack, and so on, da capo. It was not unlike the methodical procedure of a parrot in a cage: first it seizes a cage-wire in its beak; then it advances one claw; then the other; then having thus established a new forward-base, it advances its beak once more, and so on da capo. We note that the necessity for naval bases lends a certain rigidity to the procedure. But modern methods of refuelling on the high seas, and the provision of base ships which can accompany fleets and carry out minor repairs, must have the effect of increasing the fluidity and independence of fleets. Further developments in this direction should be reckoned with.

It was at about this time that MacArthur was reported as saying that he did not intend to advance methodically from island to island, but that he would "leap-frog," though I forget if that was the precise word used. As this report was given out to the world, it presumably reached Japan, and I supposed it was intentionally designed to deceive them. I was, therefore, at first somewhat surprised to find that this was in fact being his method of progression. Then I saw the light—it was a clever piece of "double-bluff." The Japs would not believe he was speaking the truth, and would thus be deceived. And I expect they were.

cided to concentrate the bulk of their fleet against the American landing, the two portions had to approach from opposite directions. In other words they were necessarily operating on exterior lines. It is this aspect that adds so much to the strategical interest of the operation. The Singapore squadron, picking up a contingent at Brunei (Borneo), en route, contained seven battleships. Splitting again off the west coast of the Philippines, the northern squadron, containing five capital ships, steamed through the Sibuan Sea to emerge through the S. Bernardino Straits. The southern squadron, containing two capital ships, steamed through the Surigao Strait just to the south of Leyte, where the invasion was taking place. Meanwhile the Formosa squadron was approaching Luzon from the north. There can be no doubt that the strategical plan was a simultaneous attack on the American naval force that was covering the landing. The upshot is of course well known to American readers. The Singapore Fleet was opposed by ViceAdm Kincaid's Seventh Fleet, containing six capital ships. The bulk of it, including all the battle ships, was stationed in the Surigao Straits, whilst carrier escort groups were stationed off S. Bernardino Strait. The former repulsed the Jap southern squadron, sinking nine out of the fifteen

When the Americans invaded the Philippines they were getting too close to Japan, and the Nips could hardly afford to let the invasion go unchallenged. She called her fleet out of hiding. The result was the most interesting strategical naval operation of the whole war, the Jutland of World War II

It was, it must be admitted, a pleasing strategical situation to possess, with command of both sea and air and an almost unlimited choice of objectives. It became an immense guessing game, and by the laws of probability the odds were heavy against the unfortunate Japs' guessing right. They hardly ever did guess right. The most serious example of their guessing wrong was at the invasion of the Philippines; they confidently informed the garrison that there would be a pincer attack from the north and south. Instead MacArthur selected the centre for his attack, thereby achieving complete surprise. (To be quite accurate, it was on the recommendation of Adm Halsey that Leyte was selected as the point of attack.)

The Americans* were now getting uncomfortably near to Japan itself, and the invasion of the Philippines could not pass unchallenged. The Japanese fleet was therefore called out of its hiding and rushed forward in a desperate attempt to interfere with the landing. The result was the most interesting strategical naval operation of the whole war,—the Jutland of the Second World War.

The Japanese main fleet was based on Singapore and a lesser portion on Formosa. Consequently when they de-

ships that entered the strait, including one battleship. The escort carriers fought a gallant delaying action for five hours against the overwhelmingly superior northern Jap squadron, whilst Adm Halsey's Third Fleet steamed north at full speed and engaged the Formosa fleet off Cape Engano, the northern tip of Luzon. The Japs were repulsed, ten out of seventeen ships in his carrier task force being sunk. Halsey then broke off the action and rushed south to assist the S. Bernardino force. Before he arrived the Japs, who presumably had news of his approach, turned tail and fled up the Strait. The bulk of the casualties were caused by the Air Arm, but some few Japanese ships were caught by gunfire.

Thus the Japanese fleet was repulsed and "practically destroyed." Its remnants returned to port, and, like the German High Sea Fleet after Jutland, never appeared on the open sea again.

LET US ANALYSE this supremely important battle in terms of capital ships engaged, for that forms a rough guide as to relative strength (which is all we are here concerned with.) If the enemy could have concentrated both their Singapore squadrons against Adm Kincaid, they would have outnumbered him by seven to six.

^{*}There were no Australians in the Philippine operation though a British fleet eventually co-operated.

If in addition the Formosa squadron could have evaded Adm Halsey and arrived at the right time there would have been a concentration of nine capital ships against the Seventh American Fleet. There can be little doubt that this was the Japs' intention. That it failed was of course due in part to the unsuspected presence of the American Third Fleet. The only way to have ensured evading this fleet would have been to join up with the Singapore Fleet to the west of the Philippines before approaching that objective. Similarly the only way for the Singapore fleet to ensure outnumbering Kincaid's capital ships was to keep their own fleet concentrated. If navigational or tactical considerations made it impractical to use the one Strait only then the sound strategical procedure would have been to sail right round to the north or south of the Philippines.

It will also be noted that the Formosa fleet did not synchronize its arrival correctly. This made Halsey's strategy all the easier and the more effective, for he was given time to utilize his possession of the interior lines to attack first one enemy and then to switch across to the other, in the best 1814 Napoleonic style.

WHAT STRATEGICAL LESSONS can be learned from this? But as a preliminary, to clear our minds, let us take a quick glance at the tactical aspect of exterior lines in naval warfare. Provided you can bring it off, there are, as it seems to a layman, several advantages to be gained from their use. Crossfire is distracting and of bad moral effect to the target attacked; there is more chance of bringing all ships and guns to bear; at least a portion of the attackers will have the advantage of the light in whatever quarter it be; an enemy smoke-screen will only be effective against a portion of the attacking ships, and finally crippled enemy ships will have little chance of getting away. But please note my italics. The chances of bringing off such an engagement on the open sea would seem to be small when one remembers "the wide open spaces" of the ocean and the vast speeds with which modern ships travel. A delay of about seven minutes in receiving a signal at the battle of Jutland resulted in the Fifth Battle Squadron passing right out of the battle until too late to be really effective. Two fleets passing one another at full speed could be out of sight 15 minutes later. Fog and night, of course, add to the difficulty of contriving to concentrate on the precise area where the hostile fleet will be. This is the reason why such encounters on the open sea occur so seldom. But when the hostile fleet is strategically stationary, such as in the present case where it was tied to the land force, the possibilities of effecting a concentration are greater. This consideration no doubt weighed with the Japs in deciding on such a strategical concentration.

This brings us on to the strategical aspect. The fact

that the American covering force was tied to a given area made the operation possible in theory, but theory does not allow for friction de guerre. To ensure concentration on the battlefield you cannot afford friction de guerre. But you cannot avoid it. So many things can go wrong, and no doubt did go wrong in the Japanese fleets—changes in the weather, miscalculations, bad navigation, enemy action, etc., that a synchronized attack cannot be ensured, and, as we have seen in this case, did not come off. It was one of Napoleon's most positive injunctions that you should not attempt to unite two corps on the actual battlefield. If this has largely lost validity owing to improvements in communications on land, it seems still to be applicable at sea.

It would be dangerous to assume that improved means of communication nowadays are bound to make operations on exterior lines at sea easier than heretofore. Every military invention leads sooner or later to a counterinvention. Radar may be bent; wireless may be jammed; visual communications may be obscured by fog, natural or artificial. There are the further difficulties, compared with land warfare, that you have not the assistance of spies*, and that it is easier for a fleet to slip away in the night than for an army to do so; the German escape at Jutland is a classic instance of that.

The result of the above thoughts seems to be that at sea the interior lines and concentration of force is preferable to exterior lines and dispersion.

- THE CLOSING STAGES of the war need not detain us long. Events followed what was now becoming an almost stereotyped pattern, with almost monotonous regularity and precision, as, step by regular step, the U.S. forces approached inexorably the homeland of their Oriental opponents. This very sameness is a tribute to the planning of the staff and to its execution by the troops. The only thing that varied was the casualty list. This tended to increase the nearer the Allies approached Japan, as resistance became even more bitter. But there are few fresh lessons to learn, or new features to record, except the advent of the atomic bomb. As to this, all I will remark is that it seems extremely problematical whether it will ever be used again. To ensure that this shall not happen, there appear to me to be two essentials:
- That the bomb be made infinitely more powerful than it is at present.
- (2) That there be no international inspection of atomic plants.

My reasoning for these apparently hare-brained ideas is that the more powerful the weapon be the more chary will any power, or any individual, be of actually using it.

^{*}Oldfashioned word for Fifth Columnist.

If made powerful enough it might become impossible to avoid damaging one's own nationals as well as the enemy. The complete absence of inspection of the other man's country will induce the fear that he may have progressed in its improvement and speed of manufacture more than one's own country. It was this fear of the unknown that deterred Hitler from using gas in the last war. In the meantime how foolish we should look if we banked on using it and so neglected the study and practice of normal forms of warfare!

₱ I HAVE ELSEWHERE LIKENED the war structure provided by the three services to a pyramid, of which the lowest layer or plinth is the navy, whose existence is for an island power fundamental, the middle tier is the air force which depends on the navy to establish fighter bases overseas; the top tier is the army which, depending on the air force to provide an umbrella for its operations, is the ultima ratio, imposing our will upon our enemy by its physical presence. How far does the war in the Pacific bear out this simile, and how far is it likely to hold good in a future war? The above conceptions regarding the navy and army appear fundamental and not susceptible of argument. (The very existence of the Marines is an illustration of the interlocking of the services). The case of the air force is more controversial. I cannot enter here into the question as to whether the air could win a war outright, whether by the application of the Douhet theory, or the atomic bomb, or by any other means. Assuming that armies will continue to be carried overseas by fleets, how will the air fit into the strategical picture? Now the air played a very important part in the Pacific War (though I have not stressed it in my brief narrative); the multiplication of aircraft carriers by the U.S.A. almost revolutionized the operations, so that an "airminded" student of war might be inclined to ascribe to it a sovereign place or function. But I do not think this view of the matter can be sustained. Granted that in the aggregate the air played a tremendous part in the defeat of the Japs in terms of the casualities and damage inflicted, an analysis of the work carried out by it shows that it must be divided into two very distinct functions. One function is to act as the eyes and long-range artillery of the fleet in case it is challenged on the sea. The other is to act as the eyes and long-range artillery for the army during its operations. In the one case it in essence forms a part of the fleet, and in the other a part of the army. But similar if not identical planes, carried in the same carrier may be employed in either function. In other words there are in essence only two, not three services: the naval and the military. The air force in my simile of the pyramid may be likened to the layer of cement which binds the navy and the army together. (The strategical air force which engages in what I call logistical war does not come into this picture.) The

functions of the fleet are given by Sir Julian Corbett as, blockade, keeping the high seas open for our own surface vessels, and co-operation in amphibious operations. How in a global war, such as we are considering, where a large proportion of the earth's surface is in arms against another, to blockade your adversary effectually will, from the enormous extent of the frontier, become almost impossible, while the chances of its reducing the enemy to surrender will become the more remote the greater and wider his possessions are. If then we cut out the function of blockade there are left the protection of overseas trade and the conveying of a landing force and protection of its operations. The one function to a large extent involves the other. It is hard to envisage an islandpower dispatching overseas an army unless it has sufficient command of the sea. Ultimately therefore, the main function of the navy of an island power is to make possible, and assist to maintain operations on land.

THIS CONCEPTION of the functions of the fleet in a situation similar to the war in the Pacific seems to confirm the views of the leading writers on the functions of the fleet in the between-the-wars period.

Sir Julian Corbett in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy declares simply that "the object of naval warfare must always be . . . either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it." Adm Richmond points out that the destruction of the hostile main fleet may not be involved since it may take refuge in harbor. He also points out that naval blockade may be countered by increased trade on land. This removes two of the functions of the navy from the category of "essentials" and we are left with one great function. which is well expressed by Bernard Brodie: "All naval enterprise-with the exception of bombardment of land objectives from the sea, which is only an incidental use of sea-power-is directed towards the single aim of effecting the movements of the lowly freighter or transports in which is carried nearly all the commodities and men that move across the sea." (A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy.)

How exactly does this description fit the role of the allied navies in the Pacific War! Had the war not ended so abruptly it would have seen the navy affecting the movements of nearly a million soldiers on to the native soil of Japan.

The course of maritime operations in the Pacific War has therefore run true to form, as envisaged by our prewar theorists, and I can descry no convincing reasons why, in the event of another global war, the same general principles should not be operative.

The course of this war seems to bear out my description of the navy as the base of the pyramid in combined operations, and to confirm the pronouncement of Adm Mahan with which I headed this paper.

US ** MC*

Getting Ashore Faster

By Maj Paul M. Jones

WHEN CADETS OF THE U. S. MILITARY ACADEMY swarmed across Virginia shores during Operation CAMID II last summer they made an impressive sight. Their landing was as near perfect as modern planning methods could make it. Every problem had been anticipated and every detail arranged—down to who was responsible for policing the beach area after the landing.

They looked fine. But they didn't feel as well as they looked, because they had spent over an hour circling

in rendezvous areas, in choppy seas, before coming ashore. Several cadets had just been seasick, and most all were a

little bored from playing "ring around the rosy" in small boats. Instructors were frequently asked the question, "why didn't we come ashore shortly after reaching the rendezvous area, instead of waiting there so long?" This question is an old one to Marine officers, who have spent large portions of their amphibious lives riding around in landing craft. Everyone, at one time or another, has wished there was some way to get ashore without being treated like dummy cargo.

What can be done to remedy this situation? The ship-to-shore phase of an amphibious operation does take too long. Present doctrine allows for the rendezvous area to be either a meeting place for all waves, or a checking in point for each wave on its way to the line of departure. This second use, as a way station only, is seldom used, but offers the best possibilities for clipping minutes off the time schedule.

Saving time may well be more important in the up to date amphibious operation than any other single item. In any future war, guided missiles and atomic bombs will take heavy tolls of assault shipping. We must keep losses down. Casualties to both ships and to embarked troops can be lowered by reducing time spent near the target. It is imperative that we pioneer in the use of faster cargo handling and unloading procedures, and develop a briefer ship-to-shore movement. One way to speed up ship-to-shore movement is to improve landing craft. Future landing craft should have overhead cover for troops, increased speed, and perhaps an interior lining

to protect personnel from the effects of atom bomb explosions. These changes will take place in due time. The only practical solution at present will be the development of method, using only the equipment the amphibious forces now possess.


Let us compare the way we now carry out the shipto-shore movement with the way it might be executed. Current practice is for the ships to arrive in the outer transport area about 180 minutes before H-hour. The

> various ships then follow a standard pattern, which, omitting the possibility of rail loadings, is as follows: Empty

landing craft are lowered and proceed to circle in assembly areas. These craft are called alongside when needed, loaded, and dispatched to the rendezvous area. In the rendezvous area, boats form wave circles and continue circling until all waves arrive, at which time the lowest numbered wave is dispatched to the line of departure. After arrival seaward of the line of departure, a wave waits until the control vessel directs it to proceed to the beach. The other waves follow the same pattern. Precious time is wasted under this system, a system which has changed little since FTP 167 came out in the thirties.

If the Marine Corps is going to stay ahead in the development of amphibious operation, we should initiate experiments to reduce the time intervals of the ship-toshore movement. A solution might be worked out along these lines: Only landing craft assigned from other ships to augment a transport's small boats, plus half of its own boats, need form up in assembly areas. The last ten LCVPs to be unloaded from the transport could proceed directly to the ten debarkation stations. Several might have to lie off until the ship's LCMs were unloaded, but the majority could start embarking troops and equipment immediately. Careful planning by ship's captains to make all davits and winches ready, and to have boats partially lowered by the time the outer transport area is reached, would save a few valuable minutes. Of course even more time could be saved by pre-loading and rail-loading small boats. These war developed practices are considered too dangerous for peace time use-

Cadets from West Point and Middies from Annapolis made an impressive sight during Operation Camid II last summer. The landing was near perfect, but the troops didn't feel well. An hour circling in small boats made them seasick



Transports need not reach the outer transport area until H-minus 80 or 85 minutes instead of the present H-minus 180.

Landing craft should be railloaded or preloaded. Boats may be partially lowered by the time the outer transport area is reached.

Rendezvous area should be a checking-in point, not a meeting place for all waves. A wave should not be held longer than eight or ten minutes.

Landing craft speeds should be better than the present nine knot average. Reduce the time spent in boats and fewer troops will get seasick.

but how can progress be made without accepting a few risks?

As soon as all boats of a wave are loaded, the boat wave commander should order the wave to the rendezvous area. The rendezvous area ought to be regarded as a checking in point on the way from the ship to the line of departure, and not as an appointed place of meeting for all waves. Generally speaking, a wave need not be held at the rendezvous area longer than eight or ten minutes. Nor is it necessary to assemble all waves before dispatching the lowest numbered to the LD. It might be held this procedure would not allow time to replace waves destroyed by enemy action, or to replace boats having mechanical trouble. The answer to this is that military and naval planning must anticipate use of all personnel and equipment on a given time schedule. Then too, landing craft develop most of their mechanical failures just before or just after entering the water.

If these methods were adopted and followed, transports would not have to arrive in the outer transport area until 80 or 85 minutes before H-hour. This estimate is based on a speed of nine knots for landing craft, and on the assumption that the outer transport area would be 18,000 yards from shore, the rendezvous area 1,000 yards towards the shore from the ships, and the LD 5,000 yards from shore. These distances allow for some measure of protection against short and medium range guided missiles.

Although we want to save time in order to save ships, landing craft, and troops, there is another reason for haste. Troops often become seasick when compelled to remain in circling landing craft for long periods of time. This reduces their combat efficiency a considerable degree by the time they hit the beach. Reduce the time

troops spend in landing craft and fewer will get seasick. With increased emphasis on cold weather operations these days, another factor, that of exposure to cold and salt spray, is introduced. Our limited experience has indicated that here, too, speed will be an important factor.

The first wave in modern landing operations is usually composed of LVT(A)s; second, and sometimes succeeding waves, may be LVT(3)s. Both of these amphibious vehicles are carried to the target in LSTs, which usually come into the transport area about the same time as the transports. Since they come close to the LD to discharge their vehicles, they occupy an extremely vulnerable spot for a long time. The 5,000 yard trip from the line of departure to shore requires 30 minutes for LVTs. Since the LST area is only a short distance from the LD, it should not be necessary for LSTs to arrive until H-minus 50 or H-minus 55 minutes.

To summarize, we must speed up the amphibious operation if we are to keep ahead of the development of new weapons. We can do this with our present equipment, but we must conduct experiments to reduce time intervals in the phases of ship-to-shore movement and hasten cargo handling at the ship and at the beach. Wartime casualities to shipping and to troops would thus be lowered, and the troops would arrive at the beach in better condition for fighting. Reduced time intervals would also save money in peace time by reducing the fuel consumption of landing craft. The procedure suggested would allow all transports and landing ships to make their approach to the target much later than at present, and would halve the time consumed in the shipto-shore movement. There must be other ways to do the thing better, so if you don't agree with this solution, US # MC let's hear yours!

Base Plate McGurk .

The Defense Rests

MICHAEL PATRICK McGEE BARGED INTO THE DAILY five-o'clock meeting of the "Ale and Quail Club" with all the grace and ease of a battle wagon coming into the Quantico boat basin. That he was sore was attested by the color of his face which, at this point, matched the color of his hair which, at any point, was as red as a "Maggie's drawers" on record day. Although he had only been in the outfit a month or so, he had already acquired the nickname "Boat Space" since he weighed exactly 224 and took up as much room as a marine with complete combat equipment.

"As I was saying," Dusty drawled as he anxiously watched Boat Space settle his bulk on the bed, "this illustrious discussion group has of late been giving more attention to the ale than to the quail. It seems to me that someplace there must be some lovelies that would be willing to join us in an evening of fun and frolic."

"You're either optimistic or losing your marbles," growled Johnny, "As chairman of the social committee I can definitely state that all of our contacts require the same old solemn promise and cannot be swayed from their unreasonable and strictly feminine point of view."

"As bad as that," Dusty sighed.

"Yes, only worse," Johnny said. "Besides requiring that we have absolutely no shop-talk during the evening, they now require that we dance every number including, mind you, the rumbas. What we need are some new contacts."

"How about you, Boat Space?" Dusty asked hopefully. "Don't you know of some new girls that have never heard of our failings?"

"You see before you," Boat Space moaned, "an expert

on the offense whether it be against abusive males or elusive females. However, that is not sufficient. I was directed this afternoon to give some thought to the defense and that is what galls me and requires all of my attention henceforth."

"Why I thought you had a company problem on the defense just this afternoon," I said with some surprise.

"I did. I have a problem on the defense at least once a month," Boat Space replied heatedly, "I don't see how I can have any more without driving my whole company nuts. They're always the same dull, lifeless, routine of selecting the positions and then organizing them. Final protective lines, primary target areas, and all that old stuff. Why bore the men constantly with that kind of training when they know it cold anyway? Furthermore, why waste time repeating it when you can have interesting offensive problems with a lot of movement and action?"

"Why don't you try a new area?" I suggested brightly.
"I've done that, of course," Boat Space said, "I've even had them dig-in some times but that doesn't add much. The whole thing boils down to the fact that the defense is not, never was, and never can be one tenth as interesting as the offense."

"That's a pretty strong statement," Dusty remarked, "I agree that the best defense is a good offense and all of that line of reasoning. However, you can't always be on the offensive and it's important that we understand the defense thoroughly. I think your trouble lies in the fact that you don't understand how the defense really works."

"What are you driving at?" Boat Space snorted.





Boat Space's cronies at the daily meeting of the "Ale and Quail Club" set him straight on a problem that had him blowing off steam. He discovers that with a little ingenuity a defense problem can be interesting as a simulated attack

"Well," Dusty said, "you stated that you trained in the selection of the position and the organization of the position. Now admittedly those two parts of the defensive picture are not the most interesting, particularly since on the lower unit level we don't have much lee-way in deciding what piece of terrain we will defend. Furthermore, since we are limited in the number and types of troops and weapons under our immediate commands, how we organize the position is definitely limited and pretty well controlled by accepted doctrine. However, how we fight the battle is primarily our responsibilities. In other words, there is a third part that is necessary to complete the defensive picture and that is called the conduct of defense. Now what I'm driving at is that you've completely overlooked the conduct of the defense and in so doing have missed the most interesting part."

Dusty stopped, looked around sheepishly, and lit a cigarette.

"Keep going, Dusty," Boat Space said earnestly, "you're not hurting my feelings. I think you've got something."

"Well, this is the way I look at it," Dusty said. "A lot of the positions we cracked during the last war were on the best defensive terrain available and were well organized. We all know that the individual soldiers we were fighting were brave and well disciplined. What then was the weakness in these defensive set-ups that made it possible for us to reduce them?"

"O.K. we get it," Johnny replied, "But specifically what would you say is the proper way to conduct a defense?"

"Just like everything else—that depends on the situation and is different in every case."

"Now wait a minute," Dusty went on hastily as he

noticed the smirk on Johnny's face, "I'm not trying evasive tactics. Although there may be no set rules for a well conducted defense I think that there are certain characteristics that you will find common to all successful defenses.

"For instance one characteristic might be called intelligence. By this I mean getting all of the information possible on both the enemy and friendly units and interpreting that information correctly. Active patrolling and the sending of prisoners and capured documents immediately up the line will give us dope on the enemy. Higher authority, through the intelligence sections, can take the information we send up, turn it into intelligence and send it back down for our use. Battalion gets the dope on what friendly adjacent units are doing and intend to do by means of liaison officers and information from higher up. How suitable the wind velocity and direction is for either the enemy's or your own smoke as well as visibility and temperature are bits of intelligence you can figure out for yourself."

"Obviously we must know all we can about the enemy," Johnny said, "but why should we worry about our friendly units? If the company on my right decides to commit its support there's nothing I can do about it. Seems to me you'd just be cluttering up your mind with dope that you can do nothing about."

"Granted you can't keep that company commander from committing his support," Dusty said, "but when he does so, you know that he's having plenty of trouble and getting a lot of enemy pressure. On that bit of intelligence you may shift some men or weapons to that flank or, if nothing else, simply make plans as to what you will do in case the enemy does penetrate his position. At least you won't be completely surprised if you





suddenly get hit on the flank from a sector you thought was friendly. If battalion commits the reserve company it's important that you know about it since this dope will certainly affect your plans for using your support."

"Well, how is the company commander supposed to get all this dope?" I asked. "You certainly wouldn't make any numbers by calling up the different units and saying 'What are you doing, what do you intend to do, and please let me know as soon as you do it'."

"That's battalion's job, Base Plate," Dusty smiled. "It's just as important for them to pass information and intelligence down to us as it is for us to pass it up the line to them. Furthermore, this passing of dope up and down the ladder must be continuous so that the intelligence concerned will be timely and not ancient history by the time it arrives. And this brings us to my second characteristic which I call coordination and teamwork.

"Passing information and intelligence up and down the line is a good example of teamwork which in turn contributes to a well-coordinated defense. Under this characteristic fire discipline and fire control can also be listed. Obviously if this fire discipline and/or fire control is lacking, the unit, no matter how small, will be acting as a bunch of independent groups rather than as a coordinated team. Petty jealousies and childish rivalries between commanders make coordination and teamwork impossible. You collect a team of five All-American basketball players and the next night send them against any first rate college club. You know what would probably happen. Well the same thing happens if you have three company commanders, or three battalion commanders all striving for individual recognition and honors. Furthermore, just as in the case of a first rate basketball, football or baseball team, the best way to attain really good coordination and teamwork is by engaging in thorough and hard training.

"Now, Boat Space, you said a while ago that you preferred training based on the offense because there is a lot of movement and action. Well there's also a lot of movement and action in a well conducted defense. The concept that the defense is a fixed stationary condition is not only erroneous but is also extremely dangerous. A defense must be fluid and capable of changing as circumstances dictate. In other words, it must be mobile and mobility is therefore my third characteristic.

"Basically this mobility is achieved by movement, depth, and reserves. Movement in the defense may be either the moving of fires or the moving of personnel. Maybe the word shifting would better describe this since I mean changing from an original position or action. For instance, if an enemy penetration endangers the flank or rear of a platoon, the commander must either shift the fire of designated men or shift the men themselves to supplementary positions to counteract this threat. Of course, control and prior planning will determine the success of this movement for it must be conducted usually during the most critical stage of the combat and under the very nose of the enemy."

"Besides enemy action," Johnny interrupted, "another cause for movement is visibility. Positions that are hot stuff during the day are sometimes not so good for night and vice-versa. For instance, during daylight it's a good idea to cover open areas by fire whereas at night it's too bad for you if those open areas are not covered either by patrols, by dug-in positions, or by a combination of both."

"Right, Johnny," Dusty said and continued, "Well, so much for movement. Now depth contributes to the mobility of the defense by limiting penetrations or envelopments, which in turn allows us time to move or shift our fires and personnel. Naturally the old system of successive defensive lines which was used in the first World War has gone by the board. In place of this so-called "Linear Defense" system we used what was commonly called during the war the "hedgehog" system. As we all know this form of defense has as its basis the organization of islands of resistance capable of all around defense. However, have you ever stopped to





consider that this system has also changed the concept of a unit's flank since by the shifting of fires and personnel easily and quickly, a new front can be presented to any enemy threat?"

"I'm beginning to see your point," Boat Space declared enthusiastically, "I could have an interesting problem on the defense in which we spent our whole time doing nothing but shifting fires and personnel to meet every known enemy action."

"I suppose you could," Dusty said, "although I've never tried it. Anyhow, to continue—as I said, the third means of achieving mobility is by the proper use of reserves. How reserves provide mobility in the defense is apparent and I won't waste time explaining it. Now that I've had my say, how do you birds feel about my ideas?"

"I think they're damn good," Johnny answered slowly, "but I'd like to add a characteristic of my own. I think that every well-conducted defense must be aggressive. By that I mean determination, will-to-win and all that stuff. Mobility is only effective if such movement is conducted quickly and aggressively before the enemy has a chance to organize to meet it. In other words, advantage must be immediately taken of errors or failures on the part of the enemy. A commander who conducts his defense aggressively will be constantly on his toes ready to lash back at the enemy quickly and violently."

"Swell, Johnny!" Dusty exclaimed. "I hadn't thought of that but it's certainly true. I'll gladly add that one to our list."

"Well, since I caused this discussion, how's for me to add one I've been thinking about while Dusty was talking?"

"Go ahead, Boat Space," Dusty said encouragingly, "it's a cinch we haven't thought of all of them."

"Surprise!" Boat Space blurted out, "That's what throws them for a ten yard loss every time. For instance dummy positions, good camouflage and concealment, mines and booby-traps, shifting to alternate positions—

Say! I get it! All of these so-called characteristics are tied in together. If you have mobility you will be able to effect surprise. If you have good coordination and teamwork you'll be able to have mobility. If you have intelligence you'll be able to have aggressiveness. To have aggressiveness you must have mobility and so on right down the line."

"Here's a thought on the surprise angle," Johnny effered, "surprises or unforeseen situations cause confusion in the attacking force. The greater the confusion, the greater the loss of control. The greater the loss of control, the greater the loss of coordinated action, without which no attack can succeed."

"This last characteristic," Dusty said thoughtfully, "is possibly the most interesting of the bunch because it's pretty obvious that the amount of surprise inherent in a defense is dependent wholly on the amount of ingenuity and imagination possessed by the commander concerned.

"Well, anyway, we now have intelligence, coordination and teamwork, mobility, aggressiveness, and surprise. Wonder if there are anymore?"

"Probably," Johnny said, "but the main thing I think we should remember is simply that the defense is not a dull, static, uninteresting process of merely positioning troops on the terrain. I hope Boat Space gained the same thing from this bull-fest that I did. From now on I'll consider the defense as a vital, changeable, alive situation requiring continuous thought and action on the part of any officer worthy of the name."

"Napoleon once said . . ." I started to say.


"Spare us your quotations," Johnny interrupted, "Let's go eat."

"Go ahead, Base Plate," Dusty said kindly, "just because Johnny can't understand them doesn't mean they're not interesting."

After thanking Dusty, with Boat Space's help I threw Johnny to the deck and said soothingly in his ear, "There is no strength without skill."







The professional and technical subjects of a Marine officer's trade are crammed into nine months. Classes number 80 to 100 men.



The Naval Academy's primary purpose to train Many of the subjects taught have litt direct

Why Not a Marine Corps

By 2dLt William A. Reavis

THE MARINE CORPS CAN ONLY BE ASSURED OF ANother brilliant 176 years of service to the nation in its present semi-independent status if, and only if, we develop a new cohesion and solidarity within the Corps, bolstered by a sincere faith in our service as an integral whole, and at the same time carry out an earnest campaign to solidify the Corps in the minds of the American people. It is to both of these ends that we should look

to a Marine Corps Academy, founded on the basic ideals and fundamental concepts of the Marine Corps, and dedicated

to the proposition that a small fighting outfit schooled and indoctrinated with the theory of amphibious warfare, has an integral place in our new streamlined organization for defense.

It would be foolish indeed to underestimate the part that Annapolis and West Point play in the production of publicity for their respective branches of the service. Without turning a finger toward that end, they generate an enormous yearly wave of interest in the khaki and the blue, merely through their existence as service schools, established and maintained by our national government in the common interest. In comparison, however, the Basic School does nothing to bring the Marine Corps

into the home of Mr Average American, and to enlist his support for our service.


Both West Point and Annapolis play a large part in Army and Navy recruiting; not so much directly, but as symbols of accomplishment and honor, hovering above the enticing words of the recruiting officer. The only thing that a Marine recruiting officer has comparable to this is the previous record of the Corps: a huge

> factor, as we know, but likely to be forgotten in the military vacuum of peacetime. Until we recognize a Marine Corps

Academy as a vast potential for Marine Corps publicity and exploit it as such, we shall be neglecting an important phase of our interests.

The second and major mission of a Marine Corps Academy would be to provide a comprehensive, four year indoctrination into officership. The science of warfare, and particularly the type of warfare which marines will encounter, is something as broad and all-embracing as the indoctrination required for any other profession. And perhaps we should say that it is much broader. Besides the technical and academic aspects of the training, we must include in the curriculum the molding of moral and mental attitudes and attributes. Discipline,







West Point and Quantico are both primarily schools for ground officers. Their purpose and mission have much in common.

s Academy

leadership and personal integrity are things which cannot be taught from books because they are intangibles; intangibles which can only be instilled over a period of time through utilization of the proper environmental factors. It is absolutely necessary for a man to have ample opportunity to learn to take orders and in turn to give them. It is necessary for him to be exposed to a high code of honor, of service to country, and of personal integrity; and again this cannot be done overnight, or in a month, or even a year. In fact, four years might be considered the minimum period for a man to become indoctrinated and adjusted to the scheme of military life. And we can only do it effectively by providing a military environment which will indicate to him these principles and give him ample opportunity to understand them and apply them to his own life. By this I do not mean a brand of harsh military austerity, but rather an environment where a potential officer can look

about him and see what is right and what is wrong. For he is at the imitative stage, where he will follow the path which has been cleared for him, providing he recognizes the wisdom of its direction.

In a like manner, it is easy to see that even the professional and technical subjects of a Marine officer's trade should not be jammed into a crowded nine months (as in the present Basic School) to be memorized, glossed over and then forgotten; but rather should be extended over his entire collegiate life. It is only in that way that he will have an opportunity to select, reject, and absorb that which he feels he should know. By the time he completes his senior year, our officer candidate will not only have absorbed an immense amount of technical know-how, but he also will have had an opportunity to put that information into action, and will have gained leadership and an appreciation for discipline in the process. Then, perhaps we will not have to ship such a green second lieutenant to a platoon in the FMF; for we will have a man well indoctrinated to a military code, who has a good basic concept of military principles, and who has had a number of years of experience in the field of leadership, first in the process

The professional and technical subjects of a Marine Officer's trade cannot be crammed into nine months. Four years might be considered the minimum period for a man to become indoctrinated and adjusted to the scheme of military life



Twenty-one-year-old 2DLT WILLIAM A. REAVIS is now a student of The Basic School, Quantico. His military career began in June 1944 with an appointment to the Naval Academy by Will Rogers, Jr, from California's 16th Congressional District. Previously he had had one

semester at UCLA. While a midshipman he contributed articles and fiction to the Naval Academy Log. Graduating on 6 June 1947, he was commissioned into the Marine Corps. He attended Pre-Basic School for the summer months before the convening of the Fourth Basic School.

of taking orders and finally in actually directing the activities of those under him.

It is not this author's purpose to be recklessly critical of the present training program for officers, but it is necessary to show the inadequacy of the present officer sources and officer training in order to indicate that a change is necessary. First, let us consider the three main sources for Marine officers: The Naval ROTCs, the Naval Academy, and the enlisted ranks.

Fifty-two colleges throughout the country have Naval ROTC units averaging about two hundred men. Of those two hundred, from ten to twenty men are sufficiently interested in the Marine Corps to begin work in that direction by at least their sophomore year. Under the Holloway plan, a single Marine officer is on the NROTC teaching staff of each school. This officer segregates the Marine candidates as early as possible in their college careers and teaches them Marine Corps subjects. Here we have a most unfortunate situation of a group of ten to twenty Marine Corps candidates receiving all of their undergraduate professional training from one officer. And it is easy to visualize the limitations of such a training, whereby one man's opinions and ideas are made gospel to an undergraduate group. This is education without breadth or depth; education which is unable to cope with anything beyond mere surface values. One solution might be to increase the number of Marine officers on the staff of each college; but such a move would be inconsistent with the number of Marine candidates in training.

A second factor to be considered about the NROTCs

is the proportionate time allotted to military subjects. A reserve midshipman is only required to take three hours a week of military subjects; the remainder of the time is spent in a strictly civilian atmosphere. He neither learns to take orders or give them, and the major part of his work is purely theoretical. The 52 separate universities are wholly unable to provide the necessary facilities or personnel for a competent Marine Corps program, and generally the program does not fuse too well with the Naval training program. It is perhaps unreasonable to expect one Marine officer to take ten to twenty young men in Navy blues and make competent marines out of them. Instead of this fallacious system, whereby we depend on a multitude of civilian schools to provide officers, it would be far better for us to establish a central school, dedicated wholly and completely to the education of the Marine officer candidate.

Secondly, let us take a look at the Naval Academy. Or, perhaps only a passing glance is necessary, because the weakness of the Annapolis source are more apparent than the NROTC. The Naval Academy curriculum is, specifically, a program for the training of young men to be naval officers. From twenty to forty graduates each year are taken into the Marine Corps. To say that the Annapolis program is a good preparation for the Marine Corps would be like saying that if one wanted to be a good piano player it would be wise for him to study the violin for four years. Undoubtedly, our musician would be in many ways a better piano player for having studied the violin, but how much more efficient his training would have been if he had studied the piano for those four years! In some ways the course at the Naval Academy is analogous to Marine courses, but on

Marine student officers live in barracks style, with only a bunk and a metal locker to their name.



the whole the emphasis is entirely different; mainly because only part of a marine's career has anything to do with the sea. Like the NROTC midshipman, our Annapolis midshipman will have to undergo five years of schooling to become a Marine officer: four in college, and one in Basic School. How far better it would be for us to give a young man an opportunity to study specifically to be a Marine officer for four years at a Marine Corps Academy, without subjecting him to the vast amount of extraneous and ill-advised instruction which he might receive at Annapolis or the University of California!

Third, let's take a look at the men chosen from enlisted ranks. In general, they have had little or no college education, and are chosen from the ranks through a selection test which purports to be testing them on the level of college seniors. To expect an enlisted man who has been in the FMF, Pacific, for three years to pass such an examination is foolish in the extreme: one of two things will result. Either (if the test is as difficult as it is supposed to be) you will only obtain a few, blessed with superhuman minds, or (if you make the test purposely easier) you will not be accomplishing your mission of obtaining men of college senior level. Either way, the Marine Corps is just fooling itself by saving "We feel that a Marine officer should be a college graduate," then combing the enlisted ranks for men who have the education of college graduates and, unable to find them, somehow fitting the square pegs into the desired round holes. Wouldn't it be far better if the Marine Corps could offer a young man, at the age of 21-22 (after a couple of years in the Corps) a chance to go to a Marine Corps Academy, and actually get this

college education at the same time that he completes his professional education?


THAT BRINGS US to the all-important question of whether a college education should be thought of as a necessary prerequisite to a commission in the peacetime Marine Corps. A professional Marine officer has to be able to do a good deal more than lead a platoon up the side of a mountain with a dagger in his mouth and a BAR slung over each shoulder: he has to have broadness of outlook and perspective and a good cultural background. An officer in any service spends only a minute amount of time in battle: mainly he is making personal contacts, directing men in routine tasks, and performing administrative and staff duties. And all of these things require a good deal of education and personal finesse; things which can generally be expected of a college education. It is up to us to see that deserving enlisted men have an opportunity to obtain this education when they signify their desires to become officers; and we should see that they receive this training in a Marine Corps school, so that neither their time nor that of the Corps is wasted.*

We've examined our three sources of officer material for the Marine Corps, so now let's take a look at their strictly professional education. From 80 to 100 brand new second lieutenants each year are processed through a nine-month Basic School course at Quantico, dividing

*Editor: The author has evidently forgotten that two other paths are open to enlisted marines who desire commissions in the regular service. Through competitive selection they may qualify for either a NROTC program at a school of their own choice or for the Naval Preparatory School in preparation for an Annapolis appointment.

Naval Academy provides comfortable quarters which offer reasonable privacy for its students.

Spartan simplicity marks the cadets' room at West Point. Annapolis regulations are less stringent.



their time between the classroom and the field. At present, one-fourth to one-third of each class is married, some student officers having to search as far as twenty-five miles away for quarters. The unmarried officers are supplied barracks space, consisting of a metal locker and a bunk, in lieu of housing allowance. The system of education consists of lectures to the class as a whole, supplemented by subject examinations and field work.

First, let us consider our student officer. Here is a bona fide second lieutenant in the Marine Corps who wears the uniform and the insignia of his rank, and who knows absolutely nothing about either the Marine Corps or the technique of being an officer.*

He has been commissioned in the Marine Corps solely on the merit of having either graduated from Podunk University or having passed a written examination of equivalent magnitude. If it is desired to maintain a respect for the rank and the uniform, this system would seem folly in the extreme. It is nothing less than giving a man a badge of authority and then, several months later, teaching him how to use that authority. Rather, a man should be required to prove himself capable of an officership through an earnest study of the principles of command, and then be commissioned.

Second, this principle of married student officers is worthy of a good deal of consideration. It is difficult for a young married man to turn his full energies toward his professional studies: he is absent from the base a good deal of the time, and his mind is not focussed on the technique of Marine warfare. He would have been taught much more effectively if he had been approached during his undergraduate life, when he was more able and willing to turn his abilities and time towards a study of his profession, and his attentions were not being diverted to the home and to the family.

Third, the Basic School makes its biggest mistake in attempting to subject our second lieutenant to a prep school scheme of education. He is required to stand inspections, drill for five or six hours a week, and run to formations like midshipman or a cadet. It is time the Marine Corps realized that if a man is to be commissioned as a second lieutenant he should be treated as a second lieutenant, not as an adolescent. If we want to indoctrinate a man into military discipline by such methods (which are in themselves undoubtedly correct) we should make him not an officer, but an officer candidate, as witness our midshipmen and cadets of the Military and Naval Academies. To put a second lieutenant through such a mill is to deride his rank in the eyes of enlisted men and other officers, and to make that rank symbolize not command and leadership as it should, but rather adolescence and inexperience. To drill as a private with

Fourth, the study program at the Basic School is inefficiently organized as to time and methods. All instruction is presented by means of lectures to the group of 80 to 100 students as a whole, and at the same time detailed lecture outlines are handed out. The lecture system of education is recommended by prominent educators for one occasion only: the presentation of background material and personal findings by a man outstanding in his field; i.e., personalized instruction of material not covered in the basic texts. But the lecture method has been shown to be the most inefficient when the lectures cover basic, outlined material which has been thoroughly organized and explained in the textbooks and student manuals. Lecture follows lecture, and the students doze and daydream, knowing full well that all that is needed to pass the tests is a rigorous review of the lecture outlines. What is at fault here is not the printing of lecture outlines, but the lecture system itself. It would be far more efficient to have the basic professional material coordinated in written texts, with the emphasis being on individual study, supplemented by classroom discussion groups and practical work, utilizing lectures only for advanced material to keep the students' general understanding up to date. But this system is impractical for the Basic School, which has neither the instructors for small discussion groups or the facilities for organizing the vast amount of profession material into anything more permanent and durable than a lecture outline. For these reasons we must look to a Marine Corps Academy to build a more efficient, more permanent and more stable educational system.

Fifth, the physical plant of the Basic School is entirely inadequate for the job which it is designed to do. The student officers must live in barracks style, with only a bunk and a metal locker to their name; even midshipmen and cadets are accorded much better living accommodations than our second lieutenants. The student officers have precious few opportunities for indoor recreation, and the athletic and gymnasium facilities are almost negligible. Only a few hours in physical education are given during the entire year, and for recreation the students must almost always turn to outside

a rifle, to be ordered to stand locker inspections, and to receive almost daily performance marks may not be particularly degrading to an officer; but they are things which should be done during a pre-officership training period, so that the ceremony of commissioning will mean something tangible. The commission will be a symbol of ability, of leadership, of knowledge, rather than what it is now: of potential promise as an officer. Let us give these young men a Marine Corps Academy, where they can receive their training not as misplaced second lieutenants, but as undergraduate college students, with a rank which knows neither command responsibility nor necessity for technical knowledge.

^{*}Editor: To admit this would be to admit the complete failure of the Naval Academy, the Holloway Plan, and methods of screening the enlisted ranks for officer material.

sources. In short, the school provides nothing for them between four-thirty in the afternoon and eight the next morning, a cardinal sin for any school which boards men for the entire 24-hour period.

Sixth, and last, the Basic School has been entirely unable to produce the number of new second lieutenants every year which the Marine Corps desires. In this year of 1948, we need approximately 250 second lieutenants to fill the gaps in the FMF caused by resignations and promotions, and the Basic School will graduate about 85 this coming May. The deficiency of 165 needed officers may be laid to the three sources-NROTC, Naval Academy, and enlisted ranks-which are apparently unable to provide the number of professional Marine officers that we desire. However, if a Marine Corps Academy were established, we would be positively assured of the needed 250 officers a year, due to the attraction which a service academy inherently possesses. Every young man in the United States between the ages of 17-21 would be a potential candidate, and the inducements of the education and training to be provided by a Marine Corps Academy would be a sure-fire drawing card for our officer ranks. And best of all, with a Marine Corps Academy we could achieve the ultimate objective of any service school, an objective only half-way reached under the present educational setup: by the proper application of leadership and modern teaching methods, we could teach each man the advantages of a Marine Corps career and make of him an interested, dynamic leader who would turn all of his energies toward a perpetuation and glorification of the Marine Corps. And, after all, if that aim be achieved, all academic and professional teachings are as nothing.

WEST POINT AND ANNAPOLIS graduate about 800 young men annually, a figure which is much greater than the needs of the Marine Corps. This figure would indicate that a Marine Corps Academy would have a tremendous advantage over the two older schools. With her smaller requirements of 250-300 men a year, she could be much more preferential about her choice of young men; given the same field of choice, she could cull the chaff from the wheat with a greater degree of exactness, and thus obtain a higher caliber of man for officership. Of course, to obtain as large a "field of choice" as is available to the older, more firmly established Academies, she would have to implement her inherent drawing card with a searching campaign of publicity for the school and for the Marine Corps. But, as indicated earlier, such publicity not only would enhance the caliber of young men attracted to a Marine Corps Academy, but the recruiting program also, in all the 48 states.

So far, we have indicated the reasons for needing a new Marine Corps Academy and have shown the weak-



Student officers' dining room at the Basic School; a branch of general mess, but with table service.



The Wardroom Mess of the Brigade of Midshipmen in Bancroft Hall at the Naval Academy at Annapolis.



The cadets at West Point eat with rigid formality. Note folded coats and braced position of plebes.

nesses of the present educational setup. Now let's take a look at some practical ideas for such a school.

First, a word about selection. Unlike West Point and Annapolis, our Marine Corps Academy should place no dependence on congressional apointment for selection of candidates. Better the Marine Corps handle the entire selection process itself, assuring any young man who might apply of absolute impartiality and conscientious judgment.

Appointment to the Marine Corps Academy should be assigned by states, in direct proportion to population, so that all areas of the United States would be covered. The selection process should consist of three parts: (a) a personal interview to bring out the character and interests of the applicant, (b) a written examination, to determine general intelligence and also comprehension of high school work, and (c) a comprehensive physical examination. Based on his average score on all three parts of the selection process, each applicant would be listed in order of merit with the rest of the candidates from his state, and selected as far down the list as that particular state's quota allows. This method would provide an impersonal, valid selection process wherein the main factor would be personal merit instead of political connections.

In connection with this process of selection, we should organize our publicity to reach into every high school and college in the nation. We should publish information concerning the aims, function, curricula and activities of the Marine Corps Academy, and see that it reached every young man of suitable age in the country. Selection boards should, in off seasons, talk up the Marine Corps Academy and the Marine Corps in the schools, the YMCAs and other boys' clubs and in business organizations. By this publicity we would be increasing the caliber of the applicants, and at the same time bringing the Marine Corps home to every man, woman or child who has any connection whatever with a candidate, thus insuring a continued public support for our service.

Before we get into a discussion of the proposed educational setup for the Marine Corps Academy, it would be well for us to understand one important fact: a man can become just as good a Marine officer if he has taken electrical engineering or economics or Latin languages. This is true because, in general, the professional subjects which a Marine officer must know place no dependence on particular technical abilities. A prospective Naval officer, on the other hand, must have extensive courses in thermo-dynamics, steam and diesel machinery, electricity and electronics to parallel his professional education. As a matter of fact, the only choice given to a midshipman at the Naval Academy in regard to curriculum is the language he will take, so circumscribed are the needs of his technical education.

And so, because of this pertinent fact—that the pro-

fessional subjects to be covered by a Marine officer candidate are non-technical, and therefore limited in scope—we could establish an educational setup which would be unlike anything at any of the existing service academies. We could allow each man to choose his own academic major, to be pursued during his entire four year course, and at the same time present his professional subjects, which would be standard, routine and required for all under-graduates. Such a revolutionary curriculum for a service school would, of itself, erase a majority of the criticisms aimed at service schools by providing a personal field of study in addition to professional subjects; or in other words, a broader, less restricted educational program which would much more effectively bring out the best energies of the student.

Now, some recommendations as to actual organization to accomplish these ends. At the top, in charge of the entire school, would be the Superintendent, a Marine Corps General Officer. Under him would be two main educational departments, a Professional Department and an Academic Department. The Professional Department would be composed entirely of Marine officers, and would be charged with the administration, training and professional education of the officer candidates. The Academic Department, on the other hand, should be staffed entirely by civilians. Its curriculum would be divided along five or six different lines, such as electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, civil engineering, politics and economics, business administration, and history and literature. The department would be on equal footing with the Professional Department, subject of course to the Superintendent. Unlike West Point and Annapolis, it would be entirely under the supervision, administration and control of its civilian professors, providing a freedom which would do a great deal towards improved teaching and which act as an attraction for first-class teaching talent.

Under Such a scheme, we would determine the relative standing of the class on graduation by their marks in the professional subjects only, with a passing mark in the academic subjects being necessary for commissioning and the conferring of a degree. Certain academic subjects would be required for all students, in somewhat the same manner as is done in civilian colleges. By providing each candidate with a wide field of interests we could increase his willingness to learn, and at the same time provide a variated scope of abilities within the officer corps.

As has been stated before, the Academic Department and its civilian personnel would be given full latitude as to their method of teaching: they could use the proper proportions of lecture, personal study and class discussion that they feel applicable. However, the Professional Department would have rather definite and circumscribed

teaching methods; tested methods which have been demonstratively effective in the teaching of military subjects.

To accomplish this it might be feasible to set up a school for Marine officer instructors in conjunction with the Marine Corps Academy. There, the best and most effective teaching methods could be presented; and officers could be led to an understanding of the psychology and technique of the military science class. The objective would not be stabilization downward, whereby every instructor would be a robotian counterpart of every other instructor, but rather stabilization upward, whereby every officer could receive a broad appreciation of the principles of teaching technique, and apply them effectively to his own personality.

It should be the primary objective of the Marine Corps Academy to teach leadership, from the first hour an officer candidate arrives to the moment that he graduates. In conformity with this principles, every hour that passes during his undergraduate life should be related and integrated towards that goal. Freshman year should be a sharp indoctrination into the way of military life; i.e., the technique of taking orders. The second year should contain the first hours of leadership instruction; instruction which must be related both to the scheme of discipline at the Academy and that which exists in the service. Sophomore year, a man is still a follower; but he is a follower who is getting his first glimpses of the technique of military leadership. Junior year, he is given his first opportunities at small unit control: as a fire team leader, perhaps. His classroom instruction in leadership is expanded and synthesized; and he has constant opportunity to apply those principles both on the grounds and in the field. Senior year, our officer candidate has an opportunity to service in all capacities of military leadership: from squad leader to battalion commander. For an entire year he should be given every opportunity to exercise intelligently applied authority, utilizing principles which have been outlined concretely for him in his prevous two years of leadership classes. A four year course at a Marine Corps Academy could be moulded into a vast potential for the teaching of discipline and leadership, providing that the gradual assumption of command is guided by competent, cognizant officers at every step along the way. Especially in field work, our officer candidate would have unlimited opportunities to get the feeling of command; valid command over actual subordinates, instead of pseudo-command over equals which must of necessity be taught in the Basic School. By the time our officer candidate attains his commission, he will have gained a broad measure of actual experience in every position of the rifle battalion from rifleman to battalion commander, and he would have gained a good measure of experience through a realization of the actual problems which confront all leaders, whether their commands be 13-man squads or battalion landing teams.



The author says Basic School's program of drills and ceremonies demeans the rank of lieutenant.

Field work in our Marine Corps Academy should be carried out during most of the academic year, in conjuction with classroom theory. During the three-month practical training period available during the summer, activities should be divided into three phases: first, a month at sea aboard cruisers or battleships, involving a general indoctrination to shipboard life. Second, a month of amphibious exercises in conjuction with FMF units. Third, a month of tactical field work, stressing small unit leadership and control. It is only by a broad application of these three phases of a Marine officer's life that our officer candidates can gain a full realization of the scope and complexity of their chosen professions.

In regard to the physical plant of a Marine Corps Academy, it would be best to situate it at Pendleton for several reasons. Primarily it is most satisfactory because outdoor work can be more comfortably conducted there the year around than at any other existing Marine Base. Also, facilities for amphibious training are generally more extensive at Pendleton, certainly a factor to be taken into consideration when planning a Marine Academy. The Military, Naval, and Coast Guard Academies are all located in the East, and the location of a new Marine Corps School in the West might, for this reason, be advantageous.

Lastly, a word about discipline and special services. It should be the aim of the Marine Corps to provide a broader and more diversified environment than either the Military or Naval Academies; or in other words, a lessening of military austerity and an enlarging of undergraduate interests.

During the last week of 1947, the Air Force was allocated 124 million dollars for the purchase of new blue-grey uniforms. A like appropriation for the Marine Corps would go much farther toward tangible gain for the armed services, in the form of a new, sorely needed Marine Corps Academy.

US
MC

The Weasel and Assault Supply

THE PROBLEM OF SUPPLY DURING THE ASSAULT PHASE of an amphibious operation was never completely solved in the last war. There are gaps and dangling ends in our present procedure which should be tidied up. For instance, recall the Iwo Jima operation: It is not pleasant to realize just how close we came to an early forced withdrawal from that island. This crisis developed when our beachhead system of supply faltered. And one of the primary reasons for this near-break in our supply

pipeline was the almost total uselessness of wheeled vehicles once they landed on the volcanic ash beaches. The shore

parties, though hindered a great deal by the maze of wreckage and the very heavy enemy fire, could still land some front line necessities. But without transportation, these supplies simply piled up on the beach. The small amounts of the three essentials—ammunition, water, and food—actually sent forward by the shore parties to the assault troops were carried mainly by the few available weasels of each division. Many a marine, ranking from general to private, has thanked God for these weasels.

The excellent performance of the M-29C Cargo Carrier, or the "weasel," did not come as a surprise to the transportation officers of the 5th Marine Division. Prior to the Iwo landing, we had conducted extensive field tests with it and had made the following observations:

- Due to its speed, its small size, and the rocking motion with which it travels, the weasel makes an elusive target for enemy guns.
- The weight, evenly distributed on the two wide tracks, will not detonate the normal antivehicle land mine. Due also to this light weight and these wide tracks, the weasel is capable of traveling rapidly in the most difficult of terrain.
- 3. It carries one-half ton of cargo plus an additional quarter ton in the towed trailer.
- 4. The weasel serves a dual hauling need by carrying

supplies to the infantry battalions and bringing their casualties back to the beach.*

These observations, made prior to and exemplified by combat, clearly demonstrated how valuable this vehicle could be if properly organized.

Thus plans for a Weasel Assault Supply Company were submitted to the commanding general shortly after division reorganization had taken place. A decision was postponed due to the critical shortages of both men and

> weasels; then suddenly, the war ended and new military devices assumed the false impotence which peace brings.

There are two reasons for introducing this idea again. First, when the original plans were presented to interested pa. ies for their comments, they met with overwhelming approval. The reactions of junior and senior officers alike were best stated by LtCol Donn J. Robertson, CO of the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, who said this might well be the answer to a so far unsolved problem. He heartily urged that it be brought to the commanding general's attention. The second reason is that more recently it has been evident that the same old unsatisfactory method of assault supply is being used today and this is a definite mistake.

The proposed Assault Weasel Company (see diagram) consists of a Company Headquarters, a Repair Section,

The problem of supplying troops in the front lines was never completely solved during the last war. The author states that the cargo carrier was the only vehicle able to move over the volcanic ash beach at Iwo Jima with any regularity

By 1stLt Robert B. Asprey

^{*}Editor: The author in his enthusiasm has perhaps minimized the weasel's limitations. Although it will negotiate some very difficult terrain, it cannot be compared, for example, with the LVT or the tank. Originally built for use in snow and cold operations, its hull is very light and has very limited clearance (weasel 10½ inches, LVT 15¼ inches, medium tank 17½ inches). Although superior to both the LVT and tank in maneuverability and gradability, the weasel cannot clear its own way, but must operate on either open terrain or on roads and paths. Its greatest advantage is to be found on mud and sand; its greatest weakness is on very rocky or wooded ground. Trees, standing or fallen, and stumps effectively block the weasel's progress. Also its ditch-crossing ability is less than half that of the LVT and tank.



An Army weasel ploughs through the thick mud of Leyte, P. I., going up toward the front lines. This cargo carrier is at its best in mud or sand. Its main weakness is rocky or wooded ground.

and three Weasel Platoons. Under the "J" series T/Os it would logically be part of the Amphibian Tractor Battalion which includes LVTs and DUKWs. Personnel totals 5 officers and 145 enlisted men. The equipment includes 48 weasels and quarter-ton trailers, four LVTs (amphibian tractors) with three amphibian trailers and one machine shop trailer, and three quarter-ton 4x4s (jeeps). Personnel are armed with either carbines or submachine guns. The vehicles mount one light machine gun.

Tactically, each weasel platoon can be assigned at the division commander's discretion. Each weasel, with trailer attached, should be brought ashore fully loaded and should proceed immediately to the dump area of the unit it is supporting. In no case should it be used below the battalion level since each Infantry Battalion should have a section of four attached weasels, these to be used exclusively for battalion to company supply. (In case these four are knocked out, replacements will be made to the battalion either by a shift of the other battalions' vehicles or by the Weasel Company commander depending on the tactical situation and the division commander's dictates.) After it is unloaded, then, at the battalion dump, the weasel will return to the shore party CP for subsequent missions. As soon as the tactical situation permits, the entire Weasel Company will be relieved by the regular transport companies. Weasels cannot last for long periods and should not be employed

A weasel is used by an Army signal battalion to string telephone wire during the Okinawa campaign.



Two soldiers experiment with 57mm recoilless rifle mounted on weasel, East Dump Range, Oahu, T. H.



PLAN OF ORGANIZATION

ASSAULT WEASEL COMPANY (5-0-145)

Company Headquarters (1-0-13)

Repair Section (1-0-18) First Weasel Platoon (1-0-38)

Second Weasel Platoon (1-0-38)

Third Weasel Platoon (1-0-38)

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS:

(2 Jeeps)

Commanding Officer MSgt — 1st Sgt Corp — Radio Operator

Corp — Clerk PFC — Clerk

TSgt — Mess Sgt — Field Cook Two Corp — ACs

TSgt — Supply NCO Corp — Ass't Supply NCO Corp — Carpenter Corp — Ordnance NCO PFC - Ass't Ordnance NCO

REPAIR SECTION:

(4 LVTs) (1 Jeep) (3 Amph Trailers) (I Machine Shop Trailer)

Repair Headquarters WO - Maint Officer TSgt — Chief Mechanic - Ass't Chief Mech 4 PFCs — Mechanics

Repair Crew

Sgt - Crew Chief Corp - Ass't Chief Two PFCs — Mechanics Repair Crew (same)

Repair Crew (same)

WEASEL PLATOON:

(16 Weasels) (16 1/4 ton Trailers) Platoon Headquarters Lieutenant - Platoon Leader SSqt — Assistant Platoon Leader Corp — Radio Operator

First Section

Sgt — Section Chief Corp - Ass't Chief 5 PFCs — Opperators 5 PFCs — Ass't Operators Second Section (same)

Third Section (same)

for longer than the critical assault supply period unless a definite emergency dictates their use, no more than should the expensive and relatively fragile DUKW be used for cargo hauling missions which can be performed by more conventional trucks.

A weasel repair crew, consisting of four mechanics and an LVT towing an amphibian trailer, will be assigned to each Weasel Platoon and will be located at the battalion dump. The LVT will carry eleven drums of gasoline, which amount can refuel each weasel one time. This supplementary fuel plus the initial individual tank supply affords each weasel a 350 mile cruising range or 12 operational hours. The amphibian trailer carries a complete assortment of spare weasel parts and the LVT dually functions as a repair depot and wrecker. The Repair Headquarters will be located at the division dump to coordinate organizational (1st and 2d echelon) maintenance.

As regards training, this company is no different than any other military unit. It must be extensively rehearsed in all problems of land warfare. Both the operators and the assistant operators of the weasels must be especially well trained in organizational maintenance of their vehicles as well as in map reading and first aid. Wherever possible, problems should be given under the most realistic battle conditions and the repair crews, too, must be included in these problems. Operational vehicles should never be used for training. They should be kept new and powerful in order that they may provide the promised solution if the actual problem of assault US # MC supply should again arise.

What Kind of Fitness Report Do We Want?

By Maj G. S. Baze

Some months ago most of us read the astute criticism of the present Officer Fitness Report that was presented by LtCol Edward H. Drake. Without a doubt, his suggestions have a great deal of merit. But I am suggesting that overhauling a report which has been unsatisfactory for twenty years or so is much like trying to make the old Maxwell the equal of a 1948 automobile. Too much progress has been made since the report was

devised for us to be satisfied with a revision of the old one.

Let us take a bird's-eye view of the various kinds of reports

from which we can choose—look at the problem from a broader standpoint—and see if we can arrive at any conclusions.

First, what is the purpose of a fitness report anyway? The primary purpose of a fitness report in the Marine Corps is to determine the relative fitness of officers for promotion on the basis of merit in order to assure the Corps that it will get the best use of the abilities of its officers.

What sort of report will achieve this purpose? Any which will meet the following requirements: (1) cause markings to be so distributed that they are really discriminatory; that is, establish a differential between officers, (2) measure demonstrated proficiency or performance rather than potential ability, (3) be simple and easy to use, (4) have the confidence of both the persons who are marking it and those who are being marked, (5) be so constructed that it represents not the ideas of one man but a consensus of the opinions of Marine Corps officers, and (6) lend itself to correction for the difference which will exist in the standards of the various officers who do the marking.

Now any of the types of fitness reports, henceforth called "rating scales," which we are about to discuss can answer the first four requirements above if (5) and (6) are carried out. This means that if a scale is to consist of traits or characteristics then such traits

or characteristics must be a composite choice; and that if it is to contain phrases which are descriptive of the degree of the trait or characteristic exhibited, these phrases must, first, be the result of suggestions from many individuals, and, second, must have been assigned some relative numerical value based upon the opinions of many persons. This can be done by some reasonably simple statistical methods. At the same time, require-

ment (6) is satisfied because any scale which yields a numerical score can be corrected for differences in the

standards of the marking officers. It is presumed, of course, that these officers really do their own marking. Otherwise, how can you get a correction for a particular marker?

Let us consider some of the types of scales which we might use. If you will look at the figures illustrating portions of the different types of scales, you can easily see the advantages and disadvantages discussed.

Probably the first type of scale to receive any widespread use was the "Man-to-man" type of scale adopted by the Army during World War I. Dr W. D. Scott of the Carnegie Institute of Technology developed this scale (see Figure 1). It has as its salient feature a "master scale" for each characteristic rated (marked). The marking officer (rater) selects individuals of appropriate rank who are typical of the extremes and average of a characteristic and writes their names on his personal master scale. As other individuals are rated they are compared to the master scale and rated accordingly. This master scale is a theoretically stable standard, and the man-to-man scale in its entirety is easy to construct and score. It is, however, relatively abstract, and in use it has proved too cumbersome to get the required cooperation from the rater. It takes too much time and is too much trouble for the average rater to give it his best.

Another type of scale is called the "numerical rating scale" (see Figure 2). This scale consists of character-

To assure obtaining the best use of the ability of its officers, the Marine Corps should revise its rating scale to eliminate some of its flaws. A graphic scale has all the advantages of the numerical scale and provides fine gradation

Personal Master Scale For

readership	
Highest, Lt Smith	20
High, Lt Jones	16
Middle, Lt Doe	12
Low It Brown	8

Lowest, Lt Green 4
(If Lt Williams came between Doe and Jones, he might get a score of 14 on leadership. This score would then be entered on the report which was to be submitted.)

FIGURE I: PART OF A MAN-TO-MAN RATING SCALE.

Initiative	Score
Does only what is required.	1
Just doesn't see things to do.	2
Shows poor judgment in trying new things.	3
Sees new things to do but asks first.	4
Does new things properly without being told.	5
Anticipates things to be done.	6
FIGURE 2: PART OF A NUMERICAL RATING	SCALE.

Has this officer applied himself to the duties of his job, day in and day out?

Never Does more Does the Needs Lazy: needs spares than expected work assigned occasional constant thimself of him prodding urging

FIGURE 3: ONE ITEM FROM A GRAPHIC RATING SCALE. PHRASES MAY BE SCALED BY STATISTICAL METHOD.

Unsatisfactory Fair Good Very Good Excellent standing
INITIATIVE
LEADERSHIP

FIGURE 4: PART OF A DEFINED GROUPS SCALE (PERCENTAGES OR OTHER ADJECTIVES COULD HEAD THE COLMUNS).

	Scale
	Value
1. He is somewhat in a rut on his style of talk.	32
2. He tends to keep well ahead of his work schedule.	56
3. He is weak on planning.	29
4. He is making exceptional progress.	69
FIGURE 5: PART OF A CHECK LIST SCIENTIFI	CALLY
CONSTRUCTED BY STATISTICAL	
METHODS.	

Physically fit and vigorous
Looks after welfare of his men
Uses rank to dodge danger and trouble

FIGURE 6: One of a group of triads which might be used in a forced choice scale. (One item is marked M for "most descriptive" and one L for "least descriptive". Note the apparent lack of relation between phrases.) Various items are scaled by statistical method.

istics under which descriptive phrases are arranged to represent varying degrees of the characteristic. Numerical or letter values are assigned to each phrase. This scale is more objective than the man-to-man type, since it pins the rated down to descriptive phrases rather than general characteristics. Obviously it is easy to score and expedient to mark, and it is relatively simple to construct. But, as you can see, fine gradations in scoring are not feasible.

A modification of the numerical rating scale has had the most widespread use of any type. This is the "graphic rating scale" (see Figure 3). It is characterized by a straight line opposite each major characteristic. Beneath the line are ranged phrases descriptive of varying degrees of proficiency. The rater may check anywhere along the line he wishes, and the rating may be converted to a numerical score through the use of a stencil or machine. This scale has all the advantages of the numerical scale and provides for fine gradations in scoring.

The type of scale which we now use in the Marine Corps is usually called a "defined-groups" scale (Figure 4). It is a method of rating persons with regard to their standing within a definite group; e.g. low, middle or high in relation to that group. Scoring may be simply numerical according to the subgroup in which the person rated is placed, or, if a line is placed opposite each characteristic, may be the measured distance from a check mark—like the graphic scale except that groups are substituted for descriptive phrases. True, it is easy to mark, score, and construct, but it lacks objectivity for it is extremely difficult for a rater to keep in mind the degree of a characteristic possessed in terms of abstract symbols.

All of the types of scales discussed so far are particularly vulnerable to the "halo effect"—the tendency for a rater to form a general impression of a person and rate him accordingly in a number of characteristics. Consequently, there has been an effort over the last twenty-five years to reduce this effect, and the scales to be discussed now are certainly less prone to it.

The "check-list" type of scale is one in which there are no divisions by major characteristics. A large number of statements which have been assigned values based on composite judgments are included, and the rater merely checks those applicable to the person rated. The scale values shown in Figure 5 would not of course, be shown on the rating form. There is usually no relationship between the descriptive phrases and any characteristic such as "leadership." Here is a simplified example of a way to do it. A group of statements which describe good officers and a group which describes those not so good are collected. Then numerous individual judges express their opinions as to whether these phrases describe

"good", "bad", or "indifferent" officers. On the basis of the number of judges assigning a particular phrase to a particular group, a score is worked out for a phrase. Phrases which are proved by the judging to indicate nothing are discarded. The rest are included in the rating scale. Each phrase must be checked as to whether or not it applies. In some scales, provision is made for checking the degree to which each phrase is descriptive of an officer; for example, "exceedingly", "unusually", "typical", "limited", or "slight". These degrees may be expressed in letters or numbers as 1, 2, 3 and so on. In this type of scale, you are not concerned with whether a person is a good leader, or possesses a large amount of loyalty, but merely with whether a particular phrase describes the person you are rating.

The Army—with the aid of some of the best psychologists and statisticians in the country-has developed still another technique. It calls it a "Forced-choice' 'type of scale (Figure 6). The system of construction is similar in principle to that of the check-list-up to a point. This scale consists of phrases as does the check-list. But the phrases are arranged in groups of three or four. Within each group some of the phrases definitely indicate a high or low state of proficiency. Others in the same group indicate nothing. Yet, the phrases are so similar that the rater cannot tell which is which and is practically forced to pick the one most descriptive of the officer being rated. The difference between whether phrases mean something or nothing is computed statistically from the judgments of many officers. After the phrases have been selected, they may be fitted under the main characteristic if a score for each characteristic is desired. However, the rating form will not usually be divided according to characteristics.

In some fitness reports, the check-list, forced-choice, and defined-groups scales are all included and the score for the officer reported on is a composite of ratings from all three.

No mention has been made so far of reliability or validity of these scales. Of course, that is the real test: whether they will result in the same score for the same officer under the same circumstances, and whether they really measure an officer's proficiency. There are tests for this which would have to be completed satisfactorily before any scale would be worth its salt.

Now, we have looked at some of the general considerations concerning rating scales. What conclusions can be reached?

First, our present type of fitness report is unsatisfactory when compared to the improved types which we have considered. The Navy fitness report is of the same type as the Marine Corps except that it substitutes percentages for adjectives. It is basically just as ethereal and should go by the boards as far as the Marine Corps is concerned.

The graphic scale, the check-list, and the forced-choice scale are all improvements. Of the three, the forced-choice has the highest reliability and validity. The check-list comes next and then the graphic scale. From that most important standpoint, the forced-choice scale would be our choice.

However, there is still another consideration. By actual test, it has been found that a fitness report containing more than one scale may produce a total reliability and validity which exceeds that of any one scale. This was tested by the Army in combining the forced-choice, check-list, and defined-groups types. An obvious conclusion, since the graphic produces a higher reliability and validity (if properly constructed) than the defined-groups, is to use such a combination, substituting the graphic for the defined-groups type.

Such a report is a large order and no one-man job. At first glance it might seem too much statistical work for Marine facilities. But this need be no obstacle. The Navy Personnel Research section is theoretically available to the Marine Corps for such work and the writer believes that arrangements could be made with that section to do the job with data and general plans supplied by the Corps.

The next best solution is simply to adopt the Army report as it stands.

We have barely skimmed the surface of the subject of the rating scale type of fitness report. Thousands of pages have been written on it. Before we leave it, let us consider one more thing. Most important is establishing a method of compensating for the difference in the marking officer's standards, for how can we compare merit as indicated by these scales if the person who gives you the "very good" rating thinks he is giving you the same rating as the one who rates you "excellent", and who can say which is right unless the ratings are reduced to a common basis? True-the check-list and forced choice types tend to minimize the necessity for a correction, but do not eliminate it. The methods of correction are not difficult and can be applied to any one of the scales mentioned, including the one used in the Corps at present, if the adjectives are converted to numerical scores. Even when the Army used the same type of scale that we use, it was necessary to do just that-convert the adjectives to numerical scores so that correction could be made for variations in raters standards.

Yet at this writing no correction system of any kind is used by selection boards sitting at Headquarters, Marine Corps!

Then—until we can prepare and install a new reporting system—let us at least make an effort to make the reports we have somewhat comparable.

In Brief

The Signal Corps has developed a wire-laying rocket that can be fired from a hole in the ground rather than from a launcher. It will carry wire up to 150 yards. A new-type wire dispenser eliminates the use of coils. Wire is packed in half-mile lengths and weights only 48 pounds per mile.

Collapsible, rubberized, nylon pontoons, the latest thing in ship salvage equipment, are now being developed by the Navy. Nylon pontoons were used successfully at Bikini following the first bomb blast. Larger-sized models capable of lifting 15, 25, and 40 tons deadweight are now being assembled. Because of the ease with which they can be handled underwater, the new models will see extensive use in replacing steel pontoons in submarine salvage operations.

A program of job analysis is being undertaken by the Marine Corps to obtain detailed identification and descriptive data for officer and enlisted jobs which exist in the Marine Corps. The information will include what an officer or man does; how he does it; why he does it; and what skills and knowledge are required to do it. Such information will serve as the basic source material in the accurate identification of each job and subsequent revision of the Manual of Military Occupational Specialists.

The navy has designed a 3-inch twin automatic gun which may be an answer in part to the missiles of the future. It will be equipped with a revolutionary radar fire-control system by which the mount automatically picks up any enemy aircraft or missile, tracks it, computes all necessary corrections for windage, temperature, and similar factors, and opens fire at effective range.

The Army is testing an improved type of knife, fork and spoon made of stainless steel and capable of being nested and carried in a uniform pocket. Each of the new implements is made of a single piece of corrosion-resistant steel with a slot near the handle which permits it to be strung on the handle of the mess kit for washing and sterilizing.

A giant all-metal glider, which the Army Ground Forces plan to use as a carrier of assault troops or cargo, was recently test flown at Mercer Field. Called the Avitruck, this glider is capable of carrying 32 fully equipped combat soldiers or four tons of military equipment. Its high wing measures 86 feet 4 inches and the fuselage is 55 feet 5 inches long and 10 feet high.

Eligibility requirements for the Navy Occupation Medal and China Service Medal (extended) have been established by Navy Department General Order No. 255, dated 28 January, 1948. Active duty marines will be notified of eligibility by SRB entry or, in the case of officers, by letter. Former marines whose service falls within the designated geographic and time limits also are entitled to wear the appropriate ribbons. Medals will not be issued until a later date.

The U. S. Government has decided that the atomic weapons test at Eniwetok will be barred to foreign observers. Only "official United States observers" will be permitted at the Pacific atoll test site. There will be no newspapermen present. A changed diplomatic situation and a desire to keep the bomb progress secret are presumably the two major factors in the barring of newspapermen and foreign observers.

The Boeing C-97, the Air Force's new transport, is a twin-deck ship with a fuselage 110 feet, 4 inches long and is capable of carrying more than 100 fully equipped troops a distance of 3,500 miles. The plane has a wing spread of 141 feet, 3 inches. Powered by four Wrights or Pratt and Whitneys, the C-97 is reported to have a top speed of a good 400mph. The entire fuselage, except for the tail storage section, is pressurized.

Two new high velocity 90mm guns designed to greatly increase the fire power of Army tanks, are slated to undergo engineering tests, according to a recently released Army Research and Development Report. Development of armor piercing ammunition with greater power of penetration than any brought out in the last war and recoilless mortars with ammunition of higher velocities are also included in long-range research plans.

The Navy has a new eight-ship modernization program that will include the early conversion of a fleet-type submarine into an underseas guided-missile craft. Two other submarines will be converted into experimental radar picket craft and a fourth will be refitted as an underwater troop transport capable of carrying at least 160 men. The submarine chosen for the guided-missile experiment is the Cusk. The transport is the Perch, and the radar pickets are the Requin and the Spinax.

Also, the Navy is streamlining the superstructure of its fleet submarines to permit about double their present speed under water, and installing breather tubes which enable them to stay submerged for far greater lengths. The altered standard type submarines will have their deck-guns and all other protruding gear removed. The conning tower will be shaped to lessen resistance to speed. Only the periscope and the breathing tube will furnish parasitic drag.

High school graduates if found physically and mentally qualified may choose one of 13 Navy surface training schools before enlistment. They are: electrician's mate, electronics technician, machinist's mate, motor machinist's mate, pattern makers, radioman, yeoman, storekeeper, sonar operator, optical primary, fire control, radarman, and cooks and bakers.

American scientists have succeeded in controlling the flight path of a German V-2 rocket at the White Sands Proving ground in New Mexico. The rocket was maneuvered successfully in movement from left to right and up and down during the flight. The V-2 rocket was kept under control by means of an electric guidance system. It reached an altitude of about 70 miles.

The Signal Corps can whip up an Arctic storm any time it needs one, and can simulate in its engineering laboratories at Ft Monmouth anything found in the remote polar regions. It's all done with steam, refrigeration, and dry ice in a huge test chamber. Signal engineers can lay down a four-inch snowfall with a gale blowing in temperatures of 40 below.

The possibility of planting and exploding tiny atom bombs to wipe out localized concentrations of disease has been raised by experiments of that kind on animals. Small amounts of uranium 235 were injected into three white mice at Oak Ridge, Tenn. Later the mice were put briefly within range of a neutron beam. The neutrons caused the uranium atoms to explode resulting in tissue changes in the mice.

The Curtiss XP-87 fighter plane, built for the Air Force, is a four-jet ship that is operated by a two-man crew. This aircraft was designed to operate under extreme weather conditions, thus it may be one of the first designed to meet rigors of Arctic operations. It has a wing span of about 60 feet and an over-all length of close to 65 feet. Its first test flight was recently made at California's Muroc Air Base.

The Naval Academy preparatory school at Bainbridge, Md., will be supplemented this summer by a college prep school for enlisted men. The school, designed to prepare 350 students for entrance to college and universities under the Navy ROTC program, will be opened as soon as the academy prep school classes close for the summer. Present students go either to Annapolis or return to their enlisted status.

Consolidation of the air transport systems of the Navy and the Air Force has been announced by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. It was the first concrete step in the direction of unification of the armed forces since he took office under the new law last September. The new agency, to be known as the Military Air Transport Service will be under the control of the Air Force. It will operate substantially all scheduled air transport required by the armed forces and the national military establishment.

Last year's aircraft production must be trebled before the end of this year in order to reach a level consistent with security requirements. This opinion was advanced recently by the President's Air Coordinating Committee in a report which was transmitted to Congress by Mr Truman. The Committee recommended an annual production level of 5,780 military planes for as long as international conditions remain unsettled.



Okinawa

0 5 IO MILES

Marines in the Pacific War

Chapter 22

OKINAWA; THE COMING OF THE KAMIKAZE

By Fletcher Pratt

THE THIRTY-SECOND ARMY WAS ORGANIZED ON OKInawa early in April 1944, under a LtGen Watanabe. In August, when the fall of the Marianas placed the island under direct threat, Watanabe fell ill and LtGen Mitsuru Ushijima was sent down from Tokyo to take command. He brought a new chief of staff, MajGen Isamu Cho, an engineer. Both men had recently been closeted with the

head of the Imperial General Staff and were fresh from the earliest arguments at headquarters about the manner of

island defense. In those discussions there had been general agreement that the log type pillbox afforded insufficient protection against naval gunfire and air strikes and that it must be abandoned for a system based on caves and concrete. The agreement as to where the new type of structure should be placed was less general. The Imperial Staff contained a number of conservative old officers who were diehards for the idea of defending at the beach line, making counterattacks early and in great force. Ushijima and Cho belonged to the other camp, like Kuribayashi of Iwo Jima, but the contest between the two viewpoints resulted, as such arguments often did among Japanese officers, in a set of orders that embraced the ideas of both factions. That is, Ushijima and Cho were to hold at the beaches and make counterattacks but also to conduct a passive defense in the interior.

The forces assigned to the Thirty-second Army were not so large as to fill its commander with any great confidence in the value of this double defense. The area under his charge included the whole of the Okinawa Gunto, and he must provide for the defense of numerous out-islands—the Kerama Retto to the southwest, Ie Shima and Iheya Shima to the northwest—as well as Okinawa itself, which is the most important of all the Ryukyu chain that stretches in a great semi-circle from Kyushu to Formosa, screening off the East China Sea. The main island is 67 miles long, very irregular in shape, from three to ten miles wide, and has a native population of

origins so curiously mixed that anthropologists have long since given up trying to separate its elements and are content simply to call the people Okinawans. There were some 450,000 of them, mostly engaged in subsistience farming with a few vegetables for export and nearly all living in the southwestern third of the island, all the rest of which rises sharply from the sea into wooded hills and

ravines so steep as to resist cultivation. Gen Ushijima promptly conscripted all the ablebodied males to work on his

fortifications, while the women carried baskets of earth for their men or were established in comfort houses for the troops.

Of these troops he had three divisions plus a number of independent formations. The 9th, a very good and experienced division, with a history dating back to 1895, was assigned to the southern end of the island south of a line from the capital of Naha east to Yonabaru, the portion which Gen Cho considered the most defensible under the new system. This division was to be the center of the defense. In the zone north of Naha was placed the 62d Division of LtGen Take Fujioka, covering the Hagushi beaches, where it was most likely the Americans would land. It was a veteran formation, which had made the Keikan campaign in early 1944, and had since been built up via reinforcements. North of this, up to the island's narrowest part, was installed the 24th Division, commanded by LtGen Tatsumi Amamiya, whose organization dated only from 1939; it had spent most of the intervening time in Manchuria but had never been in combat and was considered untried. As with most formations from China, where guns are normally more hindrance than help, the 62d was without organizational artillery and the 24th had only a single regiment aside from the antitank company in each infantry formation. But this deficiency was more than made good by distributing along their lines the batteries of the 1st and 23d Medium Artillery regiments, the 7th Heavy Artillery

Part XX: Burial vaults of stone or concrete slabs were turned into defense positions by the Japanese. Heavy guns were placed at the entrances to tunnels with covering fire from automatic weapons and rifles concealed in small rooms

Regiment and the 110th Heavy Artillery Battalion. The designations are somewhat deceptive; the medium artillery regiments were equipped with 155s while the heavies had only 75s with a couple of 120s. All these independent guns were placed under the 5th Artillery Command of MajGen Wada.

In emergencies he could call on the services of the antiaircraft command, which contained four oversize antiaircraft artillery battalions and three machine-cannon companies. Operating under Wada's command at all times were three other fire power formations; a mortar, an antitank and a rocket command. The mortar group contained the 1st (and only) Independent Mortar Regiment, equipped with 24 of the monster 320mm mortars as well as six of the 90mm size; and two light mortar battalions, each of which had 48 81mm mortars. The antitankers were three battalions strong, plus an extra independent antitank company, their main equipment being 47mm guns. The rocket command was a single battalion with 9-inch rockets. The bulk of these formations were in the south, in the areas of the 9th and 62d Divisions. There was also a tank regiment, the 27th, but the General seems to have counted on burying its vehicles to the turrets and using them as immobile artillery, as Kuribayashi had done on Iwo.

North of the 24th Division's area and covering most of the uninhabitable part of the island as well as Ie Shima, was the remaining main infantry formation, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade of MajGen Shigero Suzuki, known as the Bimbo Tai, "Have-Nothing Unit," or "The Poor Boys." This was the result of a tragedy that had overtaken them on their way down to Okinawa in June. An American sub* torpedoed the transport that was bringing them in; there was a seaway on and 5,400 of the 6,000 men in the brigade drowned, while all its equipment was lost. Gen Suzuki was indefatigable in reorganizing his poor boys; added some conscript Okinawans and casual replacements to the 600 survivors at once and in November had the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment flown in to bring the brigade up to strength again by the end of the year. Equipment was another matter; in December he was yelling for 294 rifles, 1011 bayonets, 556 mess kits, and 64 machine guns.

THE TOTAL PICTURE of the defense at this date was thus that Gen Ushijima was going to hold the beaches and the northerly portion of the island with the less valid units, the weight and strength of the system increasing toward the south where, in the 9th Division's area, it became the full Iwo Jima type of passive defense. Outside this general scheme were some 3,500 Naval Guard troops defending the area of the midget submarine and motor torpedo base on Motobu Peninsula in the north


part of the island. Oroku Peninsula in the south had more naval men and there were seven Sea Raiding squadrons based on the Kerama Retto. Each of these was equipped with 60 one-man suicide boats; they were to attack the American fleet as soon as it approached Okinawa. All told, including the personnel serving the Yontan, Machinato, and Katena Airfields, Ushijima commanded some 87,000 men.

This was only true down to December, however. In November the lines on Leyte had cracked disastrously and Marshal Terauchi fled from his Philippine command to South China. The Imperial General Staff issued a new appraisal of the overall strategic situation. They believed that the American operations plan would now contain two phases, the first an advance from the Philippines to the area of Southeast China and Southern Formosa, consisting of a landing in China by three Australian divisions, an American landing at Takao in Formosa by four divisions at the end of March-combined with an attack on Iwo Jima by three American divisions about 19 February. The second phase would be an attack on northern Formosa in March or April by four American divisions and one on Okinawa in May or June by five divisions.

FORMOSA WAS THUS the focal point; and despite Ushijima's anguished protests, they took his 9th Division away from him and sent it to that island. This of course required a radical revision of the General's defense plans. He brought Suzuki's Have Nothings of the 44th Independent Mixed down into the eastern peninsula of Southern Okinawa except for a couple of companies left along the approaches to Motubu. The defense of the beaches was altogether abandoned (let the Imperial Staff make something of it, who had taken away his best troops) and the 24th Division was placed in the western end of the southern part of the island, its northern boundary a line from the mouth of the river Kokuba across to Yonabaru. The 62d was pulled in slightly so its northern outpost line ran across the narrowest part of the island, its southern boundary being the northern limit of the 24th's responsibility.

All the troops were set to work fortifying their areas on the new system with the greatest intensity under Gen Cho's direction. The main battle position ran from a little north of Naha through Shuri Castle in the center of the island to Yonabaru. The bulk of the artillery, mortar, antitank and machine cannon commands were emplaced to fire in defense of this line. The heart of the defense was a system of caves through the ravined and rolling hill-country where no elevation is over 500 feet. The process of making these caves was sensibly aided by the burial habits of the Okinawans, who dispose of their dead in vaults dug part way into the hills and built of stone or concrete slabs. These furnished valuable

^{*}This was the famous Tang, which did so much damage on various occasions.



Her superstructure in shambles from two Jap suicide plane hits, the destroyer USS Hazelwood lies dead and smoking in the water as her crew, with 77 casualties, fight to save their ship.

cave entrances and firing points but they were haphazard and Gen Cho was systematic.

In each sector of the area he appointed a separate commander who assigned specific hills to his units, the normal hill being of a size to make it a battalion position. The battalion commander would confer with adjacent commanders under the supervision of engineers, and arrange for the case entrances and firing points to be mutually supporting. Under battalion each company did the work on the ground it would occupy, with the help of conscripted Okinawans. The scheme was to tunnel to the center of the hill, always with bends just inside the entrances to keep fire from coming in. At the center living and sleeping quarters and supply dumps were hollowed out as caves. From these caves tunnels radiated to entrances at front, rear, and both sides of the hill. The heavier guns, if the battalion had any, were installed at the forward entrances. Just behind them other tunnels paralleled the base of the hill, running around to connect with the lateral tunnels just behind the side entrances. Off these circular tunnels were machine gun rooms, facing outward, and smaller niches

leading to rifle slits covered each machine gun position. Two of each company's automatic weapons had fixed fields of fire, 30 degrees wide and intersecting; the remainder of its heavy weapons were to be mobile.

OUTSIDE THE CAVE spider-pit fox holes were constructed with connecting trenches. Normally one-third of a battalion's men would be outside in these trenches, but the instructions were that the moment a bombardment began all but 10 or 12 lookouts were to be pulled back into the caves. When an American infantry attack on the hill began, the reserves within would immediately issue forth, always by means of the side exits, in order to take the attackers in flank. The same side exits were to be used for reinforcing neighboring hills; if withdrawal became necessary the rear exits would be employed, small suicide rear guards remaining behind to defend the forward face as long as possible.

The 9th Division, as was to be expected from its record, had made excellent progress with the work in the southern part of the island and it now went forward rapidly everywhere else. Gen Ushijima had several



The Baka, a suicide rocket bomb which carried a lone pilot to his death, achieved some success at Okinawa. Several of these were found abandoned by the retreating enemy at Yontan airfield.

worries, however. The Okinawans were lazy and showed little interest in the defense of the Empire. The morale of his troops was not as high as it should have been. When the men of the 62d moved into their new positions they expressed discouragement on finding Naha almost completely burned out by American bombing and there were complaints over the poor quality of the food. In fact these were justified; the conscription of the natives had brought it about that the normal crops of vegetables were not raised that fall and winter and the shortage had not been made good from outside sources.

"I cannot bear having just a cup of rice for a meal with no side dishes at all," wrote one of the men. "Our health will be ruined." The general issued orders that the troops should "display a more firm and resolute spirit, hold to the belief of positive victory and always to remember the spirit of martyrdom and of dying for the good of the country." As a practical step an issue of a pint and a half of sweet potato brandy was made and everybody was allowed to get drunk without any court martials or other penalties, another issue being promised for the Emperor's birthday. Pilgrimages to Shuri Castle were permitted (although it was Army headquarters) so the troops could visit the shrine there, which was of special military and philosophical interest. It had belonged to Minamoto Tametamo, the famous bowman of the heroic Gempei epoch, who had been banished thither with his arm-tendons cut, after the rivals of his house had captured him, and he left the seed from

which the later Okinawan kings were sprung. Official lecturers discoursed on the hero and how he had later returned to Japan to become the very representative of Hachiman Taro, the God of War, though reaching this island under so discouraging circumstances.

₱ IN EARLY JANUARY Gen Cho flew to Tokyo, where he explained the steps that had been taken on the island. There was some feeling that Gen Ushijima had exceeded his instructions by abandoning the beach lines in the central part of the island, which Gen Cho countered by pointing out they were prepared resolutely to defend the beaches of the southern shore. His course was in the main approved because it fitted into a new rationale of island defense which the high command had worked out. They would be well satisfied if Gen Ushijima fought on Okinawa the kind of battle that would delay the Americans a long time, forcing them to bring many ships of supply and of war into the area of the Okinawa Gunto and keep them there. The reason for this was, of course, the unqualified success of the "glorious, imcomparable young eagles" of the Special Attack Forces, Kamikaze (Navy) and Tokobetsu (Army), who had first come into action in the Philippines, making suicide dives on American ships. Already some 26 units of these flyers had attacked and Gen Cho was shown a report which specified the results as the instantaneous sinking of one battleship, six carriers, and 34 cruisers beside various transports and destroyers with the damaging of many more.

(Whether the General believed this report as written is uncertain. Very possibly; on returning to Okinawa he issued it as secret intelligence for the benefit of higher unit commanders, commenting; "The brave ruddy-faced warriors with white silken scarves tied about their heads, at peace in their favorite planes, dash out spiritedly to the attack. The skies are slowly brightening.")

Interlude-The Kamikaze. A certain amount of mystery attaches to the origin and development of this most spectacular of Japanese innovations in the war, in spite of all the elaborate examination of enemy documents and questioning of their officers that has taken place since. It was, of course, the logical outcome of the Koiso government and the strains that went into its formation. The nearest one can come to the specific process is that after the aerial disaster in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, a carrier admiral (name not specified) reported to Toyoda that he wished to organize a corps of suicide flyers and to lead them himself. The matter was discussed at the Imperial General Staff, and while no decision was reached there, its officers were in frequent communication with the Philippine command, and the first Kamikazes seem to have been organized by the landbased Navy air groups in those islands, purely as a local and nearly spontaneous affairs. When Adm Kurita led his fleet to the Battle for Leyte Gulf, he did not even know of the organization or that he would have its help in the action.

Once launched, the thing so exactly met both the needs of the military situation and the desire to find a means of bolstering a morale beginning to weaken under defeat, that every Jap leader took it up with enthusiasm, and the home government backed it by an intensive propaganda campaign. During the Philippine campaign the organization and use of Kamikazes remained more or less localized; that is, the commander at a given air station would call for volunteers, and as soon as he got

Ugaki, who worked his strategy into the general plan of campaign. He would order a local air group command to furnish so many suicide units for a prospective operation, just as he might order out the same number of dive-bombers. The air group commander, if he had not enough volunteers, then detailed some of his flyers to volunteer for suicide duty. In general, the better pilots were not allowed to become Kamikaze; and while in the Philippines, the very best and fastest bombers had been used, Ugaki's organization regarded this as wasteful, and began to employ all sorts of obsolete and obsolescent plane types, stripped of their instruments. A suicide unit normally contained six planes, and was led to its target by a well-equipped twin-engined bomber. The Kamikaze always had as much fighter cover as could be provided.

THE IMPERIAL STAFF estimated the strength of the American Fleet as 18 carriers and a total of 86 battleships and cruisers, with another 30 of the latter to be ready by June. Quite clearly not even American production could keep pace with the rate of loss indicated by the report on the Philippines, and Okinawa was so much nearer to so many more airfields that much greater damage to a fleet in its waters could be achieved. It was therefore made a formal order that none of Ushijima's guns should fire on ships at any time. His duty was to hold out on land while the Special Attack forces wrecked the American fleet. In the remainder of his mission Gen Cho was not quite so successful. He wanted more troops and an improvement of the food situation but was told that the shortage of shipping prohibited either being sent to the Okinawa Gunto at the time. When Cho returned Ushijima took his own measures to supply the manpower deficiency by conscripting the 7,000 best Okinawans into the Army, distributing them among the various units so that their general lack of a sense of

The suicide planes roared in on the fleet off Okinawa and raised pluperfect hell. Fighters shot down 245 planes, mostly Kamikazes, but the Japanese hit 23 ships during the attack. Had half this damage been to ships supporting the expedition there would have been difficulty ashore

enough to form a unit, equip them and send them out. 650 Kamikazes went out during the campaign and 26.8 per cent of them secured hits, mostly on small ships. Official Japanese statements were, of course, that the number of hits was 100 per cent; actually their high command knew very little about the number of hits, and their guesses ranged from 12 to 50 per cent, but they erred badly in thinking that nearly all the hits were on major warships, battleships, and large carriers.

By time Gen Cho reached Tokyo for his conference, organization had set it, all up and down the line, and there was a Kamikaze command in Tokyo under ViceAdm

nation and spirit of bushido would have a less effect. This brought his total muster rolls up to 83,999. Another 20,000 were organized as Home Guard Units, Boei Tai, but these were expected to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for the fighting troops except in emergencies. They ought to have sense enough to fire a rifle from a hill-cave slot.

On 23 March another intelligence statement of the general situation was distributed among the upper levels of the Thirty-second Army. It pointed out that there were now seven American divisions in the Marianas and that two or three more could be withdrawn from Luzon;

that air attacks on northern Formosa and on Okinawa had become very frequent; that American submarines had appeared in significant numbers off southern Kyushu, all down the waters of the Ryukyu chain and around Formosa, while submarine activity in the Ogasawara Gunto had decreased. The conclusion was that an attack on Okinawa or Formosa was imminent. Apparently the Americans wished to signalize the coming conference at San Francisco in a spectacular manner. At this date practically all the fighting formations on Okinawa were well dug into their positions and many had prepared alternate caves for use in case they were driven from their first lines of defense.

The battle plan Ushijima issued did not look with favor on major counterattacks but prescribed infiltrations by night on a considerable scale, spoke strongly on the necessity of units not under attack reinforcing those actually engaged, and remarked:*

"You cannot regard the enemy as on a par with you. You must realize that material power usually overcomes spiritual power in the present war. The enemy is clearly our superior in machines. Do not depend on your spirits overcoming this enemy. Devise combat methods based on mathematical precision; then think about displaying your spiritual power."

II

THE FLEET was under Adm Spruance again with Richmond Kelly Turner as his chief of amphibs. Holland Smith was probably the logical man for expeditionary troops, but that command went to a new organization, Tenth Army. Its inception goes back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and has slight overtones of what had become of the controversy about the relief of the 27th Division's commander on Saipan. There was a certain amount of feeling in the Army that Army troops ought not to be under Marine command; and also a belief that an operation which involved a force two corps strong fell more legitimately in the province of the Army, even though its operations involved the establishment and extension of a beachhead.

Adm Nimitz, whose method was always that of securing cooperation by the most generous concessions, agreed that Army should have the top command ashore. Hence there was produced the rather odd arrangement of a Tenth Army Command and Staff, with no experience at all in amphibious operations, placed over two corps organizations which were very experienced indeed. The corps concerned were the Army XXIV of MajGen John R. Hodge, comprising the 7th, 96th, 77th, and 27th Divisions; and the III Amphib Corps under Gen Geiger. with the 1st and 2d and the new 6th Marine division.

The decisions he made with regard to the Okinawa operation (which the Joint Chiefs had chosen in preference to that against Formosa) were to land the 77th Division in the Kerama Retto on 26 March, securing this group as a seaplane base and anchorage that would protect the ships against the typhoons which haunt this region; to use elements of the same division for seizing the pair of small Keize Islands just west of Naha on 31 March and emplace heavy artillery there; to land on Okinawa itself on 1 April. The landing would be across the Hagushi beaches about 20 miles from the southern end of the island, just where Gen Ushijima thought the Americans would come in. There would be four divisions abreast, the 6th and 1st Marine Divisions on the left, the 7th and 96th Army Divisions on the right. The central pair of these four divisions would cut rapidly across the island, severing the Japanese forces into two unequal parts. The III Amphib Corps would secure the big Yontan Airfield, then wheel leftward and clear out the larger, rougher northern sector of the island: the XXIV would take Katena airfield, then wheel rightward toward the more populated southern sector of Okinawa.

2d Marine Division to conduct a feint at landing on the southern beaches and remain in reserve afloat; 27th also to be in reserve afloat, and as soon as it had completed its job in the Kerama Retto, the 77th would act as a reserve ashore. Some troops from this reserve to take Ie Shima and Iheya Shima.

INTELLIGENCE BELIEVED the Japs to have approximately 66,000 men on the island, including two divisions slightly under strength, an Independent Mixed Brigade, and some miscellaneous troops. They would most likely defend the out-islands and the northern part of Okinawa with the Independent Mixed Brigade, the remainder of the troops being in the southern part of the main island. In view of Japanese doctrine and what the photos showed, the enemy were expected to defend the beach area with approximately a regiment in fortified positions, holding the bulk of their troops in mobile reserve.

The Tenth Army Command went to LtGen Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., who had led the Aleutian campaign, a big man, strong on physical conditioning, fairminded and very decisive in his attitudes. He was a product of the complete Army system, Leavenworth and Staff College. The Marines found him rather strangely formal in his approach to the question of planning, which he handled, not in their free and easy conversational manner, but exactly as the book prescribes. The staff officers would come before him with a "presentation" of the problem; when they reached a point where decision was necessary, he would say "I decide—" and nothing could budge him from the decision thus made. No discussion.

^{*}The text was originally issued by the Japanese 26th Division in the Philippines, but Ushijima consulted with the commander there, and later put it out as his own, so it is fair to attribute it to him.



Amphtracs from a Coast Guard LST churn toward the beach with the first and second assault waves on L-Day, as a sturdy old battle wagon hurls a big-caliber broadside at Okinawa's defenses.

There had been time for them to acquire the latest German doctrine of beach defense. The landing areas were expected to be heavily mined and strewn with obstacles of the most formidable type. They would probably counterattack not later than the night of landing day (L day), the early seizure of the Kerama Retto allowing them time to move their troops into readiness positions near the Hagushi beaches, which were obviously the only ones on the whole island suitable for a major landing.* This counterattack would be very dangerous. probably made by a full division on either flank of our beachhead, since the Japanese believed in the German doctrine of double envelopment. The were supposed to have a shipping engineer regiment on the island and it was likely that their counterattack would be accompanied by a counterlanding in our rear. The Navy could be expected to take care of most of the boats in such a landing, but some might infiltrate through, and it was important to provide for the security of command and communications centers on the beach. There were known to be considerable formations of parachutists in Kyushu and the Japanese would undoubtedly use them as soon as they possibly could, being willing to sacrifice large numbers of planes to drop several thousand men behind our beachheads.

All four groups (each of four carriers) in Task Force 58 sortied from Ulithi on 14 March and stood up toward the Empire. They fueled on the 16th and on the morning of the 18th were near enough Kyushu to launch a strike mainly directed at the fields there, from whence might be expected the most serious opposition to the expedition, now that the Japanese were using Kamikaze in such numbers. During the night *Enterprise* launched out six planes on radar mission to simulate the appearance of a fleet 150 miles from the actual position of ours, but it failed to work, the Japanese found our ships and staged

DURING THE NIGHT the fleet pushed farther north and in the morning flew off strikes to take care of the remnant of the Jap Navy at Kure and Kobe. These attacks were not too successful, since Mitscher had to hold out so many planes for his combat patrols against Kamikaze. In the counterattack that day the ships took it hard-Wasp badly damaged by a bomb that went through her hanger deck and Franklin taking two terrible hits from a single plane that came through the clouds. Great sheets of flame swept through her hanger and across the flight deck, she had 1,102 casualties, her engine rooms had to be evacuated, she could not be steered and steamed along masterless for hours. Pittsburgh and Santa Fe got her in tow and managed to save the ship and most of her people. The Marines at Ulithi saw her come in with the other damaged ships as they set out and wondered how such a wreck had been brought home.

It was not the only indication that the coming operation would be a rough one. The briefings on the way up were sober, to Army and Marines alike. All hands learned that they would have the support of the British Fleet for the first time in the Pacific war, two battleships and four of their armored-deck carriers going in against the Sakishima Islands which connect Formosa with Okinawa, while Spruance and Fifth Fleet went back at the Kyushu fields and their supporting facilities. The men were told that for the first time we would be invading not Japanese-held ground, but genuine Japanese territory, where the natives would be as unfriendly as the country. That country was one of the less attractive islands of the

a heavy counterattack in which they made bomb hits on both *Intrepid* and *Enterprise*. The attacks on the field were a great success, though, with the claim, probably quite accurate, of 222 machines destroyed on the ground. In the air battles at sea and overland 306 more were shot down.

^{*}This was not true; but Tenth Army thought it was at the time.

world, not jungle indeed, but subject to torrential rains, overrun with insects, having most of the tropical diseases in endemic form, and one of the world's deadliest snakes, the habu. The last item caused as much excitement as anything—unnecessarily as it turned out, since the only habu the Marines saw they caught, fried and ate.

On 28 March news of battle began to come over the ships' radios. The 77th was ashore in the Kerama Retto, had swept out two of the islands and reduced opposition in the third to mop-up. The seaplane base had been established, and among the coves of the islands the troops had found nearly 400 suicide boats, little things about 20 feet long with built-in warheads. Most of them had been smashed in the air attacks that Mitscher's carriers had been putting on Okinawa and its vicinity ever since 23 March, or in the heavy bombardment conducted by eight of the fast battleships" on the 24th. There was a cheering note in Mitscher's reports-air opposition was far less than anticipated, the strike of 18 March had evidently cut the Japs' aviation further down than anyone had imagined at the time. The gunfire support ships of Adm Blandy had arrived and were shooting, plenty of them this time, ten old battleships, ** with eight heavy cruisers,† three light cruisers‡ and 24 destroyers. The suicide boats had not bothered this armada in the least but Kamakazes coming out of the twilight had been a serious problem-Nevada's number 3 turret was knocked out, the minesweeps Adams and Skirmish were badly damaged, so was the destroyer Kimberly. Another destroyer, Halligan, and a minesweeper, Skylark, had run on mines and been blown all apart with heavy casualties. Rough work; and then Radio Tokyo came on the air with a "broadcast for you men standing off the shores of Okinawa, because many of you will never hear another program; here's some music to remind you of darlings, jazz, home and mother."

That same day the fast carriers hit Kyushu and its fields once more, with fairish results. A hot little air fight accidentally developed when one of our pilots was shot down in Kegoshima Bay three miles from shore and a pair of our seaplanes came in to rescue him, each side feeding fighters in by small groups till it became a major operation. Adm Blandy expected suicide boats to become serious when the transports arrived, and set up "flycatcher" details of a cruiser and a destroyer each for night watch, with support from small gunboats, each detail having a section of coast under its care.

III

L DAY WAS EASTER SUNDAY, also April Fools' Day—with a certain amount of appropriateness, since after all the ominous preliminaries and the eruptions of flame

*New Jersey, Wisconsin, Missouri, Washington, North Carolina, South Dakota, Massachusetts, Indiana.

**Texas, Maryland, Arkansas, Colorado, Tennessee, Nevada, West Virginia, Idaho, New Mexico, New York. ashore, not a bullet nor a sound greeted the amphtracs as they hit the beach at 0837. "There must be some mistake," wrote the correspondents getting reports aboard the flapship *Cambria* and "this is hard to believe" wrote Sherrod ashore, when Yontan airfield fell to the 4th Marines, with only a few shots from snipers and a casualty bill of two killed, nine wounded.

The correspondent found no one digging fox holes, the advancing troops everywhere standing up and talking; there were a few pitiful old Okinawans, undersized and By afternoon the artillery was coming emaciated. through and the divisional command posts with reserves, not because they were needed, but to clear the transports, since Kamikazes were expected with the twilight. By evening, when night guards were set, the lines were everywhere 4,000 yards deep, or at the point they had expected to reach by the third day, from which the men look out to see the whole sky lit with antiaircraft fire above the rolling clouds of the smokescreen. The Kamikazes had arrived, not in great force, but one got through to crash West Virginia, another wrecked an LST, and that big burning flame was where the transport Minsdale had been hit. Far to the south another group of suiciders had fallen on the British squadron, where they smashed up a destroyer, but when a second hit the armored deck of Indefatigable, the Britishers imperturbably swept the debris over the side and continued operations.

On the second day there was the same puzzling lack of strong centers of resistance ashore, the same sweeping advances everywhere, though now hampered by lack of roads across the ravines and razor-edged ridges of which central Okinawa is built. East of Yontan airfield the 4th Regiment found a group of these ravines organized and defended. They had a hard little fight, for it was a puzzling problem how to get into the gullies with fire coming down from both sides and from the dominating massif above. Supply was already becoming a problem; no normal vehicle could negotiate the ground. The reconnaissance companies of all divisions were fanning out well ahead and reporting no serious contact. The 7th Division, which had a cross-island road, reached the east coast this day and on 3 April the 1st Marine Division was there also. The whole of the long Katchin Peninsula had been covered by the 1st's recon elements. The 6th was across the ridge line and working down the slopes with some elements, while others were sweeping up to the Isthmus of Ishikawa, which is the island's narrowest neck.

That day the XXIV Corps began to have casualties, and all the next three pushed slowly forward into the outer guards of Ushijima's line at 300-500 yards a day. The Army reserve of flamethrower tanks was assigned

[†]Tuscaloosa, San Francisco, Minneapolis, Wichita, Portland, Pensacola, Indianapolis, Salt Lake City.

[‡]Birmingham, St. Louis, Biloxi.



Navy landing craft whirl around in the familiar merry-go-round formation prior to taking the Marine assault waves into Okinawa's strangely undefended beaches on 1 April 1945.

to this corps on the 5th; on 7 April Gen Buckner gave them the III Corps Artillery and on the following day the heavy howitzers of the 1st Marine divisional artillery. The dogfaces were having a rough time down there. They had fought Japanese from the Arctic to the tropics without finding any of them so well dug in, who used so much artillery with such accuracy.

All this while the 1st Marine Division was on duties mainly defensive in central Okinawa, the 6th was pushing north as fast as its supply trains would permit, and the main action was out on the rocking seas. The Imperial General Staff had launched the operation for which the Okinawa defense was planned—the great storm of Kamikazes to cripple the U.S. Navy. Combined with them was a naval attack, the last; since Leyte Gulf "there was no further use for surface ships except in special operations." The Kamikazes rendered this operation special; they were assembled in the Kyushu fields to the number of several hundred, 600, says one report, though the figure is not sure nor can be because the records are gone. The target of the naval Kamikaze was our major warships-"You will damage or sink 20 battleships and carriers" read the order from ViceAdm Ugaki, who had been placed in charge of both Navy and Army units "to produce a unified strategy."

Ugaki knew of the American weakness for escorting such damaged ships home instead of leaving them to their fate as the Japanese would do; calculated astutely that 20 damaged ships and their escort would so weaken our forces that the remnants of their own Navy could fight their way through and destroy the transports off Okinawa in cooperation with a second wave of suiciders, Army units. The date was to have been 8 April, but before that date, on the 4th, Adm Spruance's snoopers had marked the assembly in Kyushu.

He looked at the air strike reports; no B-29 had visited Japan's southern island for a fortnight, the last big air attack there had been Mitschers' strike of 18 March, so the enemy had been granted time to assemble. That night he turned prows north; at dawn on the 6th his planes were all over Kyushu, where they smashed up planes on the ground to a number estimated by the flyers of over 200, but considerably shaded from that by the Admiral, who knew how clever the Japs were at camouflage and building dummies.

The main feature was that there was an attack; of course the Jap leaders had to launch their planes at once on local responsibility or have them killed on the ground, which produced it that few of the Kamikazes had time for the farewell dinner and ceremonial drinking

of saki. This also brought it about that although they found our ships, the attacks were in succession and uncoordinated, without the heavy fighter cover that had been counted upon to make them irresistable. Some 355 Kamikazes got off the ground; 248 planes were shot down, not all of them Kamikazes. Only four got near enough to do damage. Two of these exploded close aboard San Jacinto and the destroyer Taussig. The two direct hits were bad enough; the destroyer Hainsworth much wrecked, and the carrier Hancock taking one among parked planes on her flight deck that gave her 80 casualties, buckled her elevator and holed the deck so badly she had to go back to Ulithi.

The Kamikaze for the beachhead ships had a longer distance to fly, therefore more time to form in the air, so they made their attack in better style. Adm Turner had established destroyers equipped with special radar as warning pickets on 15 several stations, forming a circle of 35 to 75 miles with Bolo Cape as its center for reference purposes. The first news came from one of these, Colhoun, north-northeast of the island, at 1500. Forty to 50 planes were attacking Bush, the next destroyer in line westward, 10 to 12 attacking the destroyer next eastward, the whole air was full of bogies and the combat patrol in heavy action with another big group on its way south. Colhoun rushed to help Bush, but found her dead in the water and already sinking. The Japs came piling in on this new enemy uninterruptedly for 25 minutes. Colhoun shot down five but three more hit her and one penetrated so deep that the destroyer's back was broken and down she went.

The remaining Tokobetsu rushed on for Okinawa, losing heavily to our outnumbered fighters, reached the transport area about twilight, and raised pluperfect hell. Two big cargo ships were sunk with part of their loads and so was the fast minesweeper Emmons. The destroyers Witter, Mullany and Newcomb were each hit by two suiciders and were just barely towed out. The destroyer escorts Forman and Fieberling, the minesweepers Defense, Devastator and Recruit, destroyers Harrison, Howorth, Hutchins, Leutze, Morris and Rodman were all hit; Hyman was hit by one with a torpedo, and another crashed through old Maryland so badly she had to be sent home for repairs. If half this damage had been distributed among the ships supporting the expedition there would have been difficulty ashore and there would have been a good deal more if Toyoda's naval attack had come off as planned, but the fact that Spruance had advanced the date on him did fatal damage to the scheme.

The battleships *Haruna* and *Nagato* and the cruiser *Oyodo* which had suffered in the March raid, were not yet repaired enough to participate and American submarines and mines had closed Shimonoseki Strait, the western exit from the Inland Sea. The Japanese Ad-

miral had only the giant battleship Yamato, the light cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers; and he had to come out through Hoyo Strait, south around Kyushu before turning west to run down the East China Sea. One of our submarines saw her; at 0300 Adm Spruance was roused from sleep. "The Yamato is coming out, sir." He glanced at his chart; the carriers were nearest. "Tell Mitscher to go take 'em," and went back to his bunk.

THE WEATHER WAS BAD and squally with low clouds, but strikes were launched from the task groups of Jocko Clarke and F. C. Sherman and about noon they fell on the Jap force, concentrating against the giant Yamato. When they took to the clouds again she had eight torpedoes in her and three heavy bombs; the accompanying destroyer Kasumi was gone. Half an hour later the planes from Radford's group arrived; the largest battleship in the world took four more torpedoes and turned over. The cruiser Yahagi sank by the stern, the destroyers Isokaze, Hamakaze, Asashimo had disappeared and the remaining destroyers of the attack force, all damaged, were hurrying back with what survivors they had picked up.

That night whatever Kamikaze could still be dredged from the Kyushu fields made one more effort in which they managed to hit the destroyer *Gregory*, out on picket duty; but that was the end of the grand Kamikaze assault that was to break the American fleet. It had done damage enough to appall people all the way up to the top story of our command and to bring down a censorship that was as stiff as anything used by the Japanese themselves for the concealment of losses. But planes and pilots were now gone, and so was all of the Japanese Navy that would ever take the sea under the Imperial standard.

Unfortunately our high command had no evidences that this was the major assault or that it would not be repeated indefinitely. How could we keep them from working up another like it? The Kyushu fields needed more attention. Representations were made to Pearl Harbor and back along the line; Gen Le May at Saipan somewhat reluctantly agreed to divert part of his B-29 force from their more important function of strategically bombing Japanese industry to that of keeping the Imperial kites in their nests. Those that did win free, Fifth Fleet Staff decided, were making the old Jap error in attacking the radar picket line instead of ignoring them to come in on transports and cargo vessels. All the same, we would run out of destroyers in a hurry if the night of 6 April were often repeated. The picket stations must be strengthened. Adm Turner assigned to each a pair of destroyers, with four LCS gunboats which, because of the heavy armament of light weapons these could carry and their low silhouette, made good close-in protectors. to be continued

This Year's PLC

TONCE AGAIN, PROCUREMENT OFFICERS ARE CIRCULATing among a number of selected colleges, universities, and institutes in preparation for the 1948 Platoon Leaders Class. The program, as in the past, offers qualified undergraduates an opportunity to become commissioned officers in the regular or reserve Marine Corps.

The plan was begun in 1935. More Marine officers were needed and a system of procurement was designed which would not conflict with then current Army and

Navy programs. The war records of many of the young Marine officers thus trained is an endorsement of the original

plan's success. It was shelved, necessarily, during the war years for more direct means of officer procurement.

By Col E. W. Snedeker

Last year saw the revival of the PLC program. Four hundred thirty-three students were enrolled and reported to Quantico for six weeks' summer training. This year's program calls for about four times that number.

To qualify for a commission the applicant must attend two summer training sessions, known as the Junior and Senior courses respectively. An exception is made in the case of veterans with twelve or more months of active service behind them; they may enroll in their junior year, take just the second summer's training, and still meet the training qualifications for a set of second lieutenant's bars.

Students in the first summer or Junior Course are ranked as corporals and are paid \$90 a month during their six-weeks training period. Senior or second year students are ranked and paid as sergeants—\$100 a month during their tour of summer training.

The PLC curricula is a well-balanced mixture of infantry weapons, individual training, tactics and techniques, marksmanship, drills and ceremonies. Training in the Junior Course is generally on the squad level. The Senior Course progresses from the first summer's training to the infantry platoon level. Students are quartered alternately in brick barracks and a Quonset hut camp. Training is conducted in classrooms, on the target range, and in the field.

As has been implied, successful completion of the Junior Course leads to admission to the Senior Course; successful completion of the Senior Course leads to qualification for a Marine Corps Reserve commission.

Each year a number of selected graduates, who so desire, are commissioned in the regular Marine Corps. The number so commissioned depends on the number of vacancies existing at the time of the student's graduation. Selection is based primarily on the final PLC class standing of the applicant.

One hundred eighty-three institutions are currently being canvassed for prospects. Final visits to enroll qualified students will be made by the procurement officers between 25 March and 1 May. Also, students at 35 of the colleges and universities having NROTC units may participate in the PLC program. The Marine officers at these institutions are authorized to receive applications.

In general, applicants must be male citizens of the United States who are in their freshman, sophomore, or junior year at an accredited school. They may not be a member of any other military organization, including the Army or Navy ROTCs. An agreement is signed

that the student will serve the required period of six weeks active training. Applicants must be unmarried and agree

to remain unmarried for the period of the training. Veterans must be honorably discharged. The student may not have a pension claim pending or be drawing any sort of pension or disability allowance from the government.

Prospects, who naturally must be of commissioned officer caliber, must be over 17 and less than 25 on 30 June of the year of their expected graduation.

No previous military service is required of freshmen and sophomores. Juniors must have had at least 12 months active service in which case, as has been mentioned, they are exempted from the first year's training. Physical requirements include 20/20 vision in each eye without glasses.

Members of the Organized and Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve who have the foregoing qualifications are also eligible for assignment to PLC under certain conditions. So are qualified students attending accredited colleges and universities not participating in the procurement plan. Requests for fuller details on these special cases should be addressed to Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

The distinguished performance of duty of the officers of the Marine Corps who were commissioned through the prewar Platoon Leaders Classes proved the program to be a sound and valuable source of officer procurement. For this reason, the Marine Corps attaches great importance to the program as a primary source of both regular and reserve officers. Readers of the GAZETTE who know of eligible students who may not be aware of this program can contribute to its success by sending this information to them.

Message Center

Restore Company Administration . . .

DEAR SIR:

May I take this opportunity to say "amen" to Maj Heinl's article entitled Rising Tide of Administration. In particular, his proposal to restore company administration has met with approbation in every quarter in which I have heard it discussed. This is the surest, soundest, and fastest way to have company officers assume fully the responsibility which should be theirs and give them the administrative background which will stand them in good stead throughout their careers.

In another place in the article he points out that there is little need for a sizable proportion of the multitudinous amount of paper work dumped on subordinate echelons. How true this appears to be! Careful screening of instructions, memoranda, etc., probably would result in a considerable reduction in the amount put out. A recent directive from the QMG, for example, authorized the issue of "one shoe, field, per man." I suppose a separate piece of correspondence will be required to authorize the issue of the other shoe. To those who are required to prepare the present day mass of paper work ("Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do or die") much of it appears to be duplicatory in nature, or is obviously so lacking in real value that its only reason for being is to preserve someone's job or sense of importance. Many reports would never be required if the Headquarters requiring such repots would instead theeof maintain regular personal liaison with subordinate units. This would insure getting accurate, up-to-date information with all desired ramifications, instead of getting a copy of last month's report done over lightly because the reporting unit is so swamped that it takes the easiest way out. As the Chinese put it, "A picture is worth 10,000 words," and truly, the visual picture gained by personal liaison is much more worthwhile than most written monthly reports.

Finally, the proposal to reduce T/O administrative billets to a minimum is not only sound but in these days of personnel stringencies we must maintain the fighting strength of our units

Each month the GAZETTE will pay five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Signatures will be withheld if requested. at the expense of administrative functions. This is not a new nor a radical concept. Even casual studies of the various T/Os issued during the years preceding the war show that in our tactical organizations administrative personnel were almost at an irreducible minimum so that the maximum number of men could be made available as riflemen, machine gunners, cannoneers, etc. With a bare minimum of personnel in administrative billets unnecessary administrative functions, particularly paper work, will of necessity be eliminated because facilities will then exist for handling only that which is absolutely required.

The solution to all this must come from the very top. The powers that be must be absolutely ruthless about doing away with unnecessary administration if it is desired to release the service from the growing mass of red tape entwining it. The administrative chair-warmer and empire builder usually dies a hard death. He may be kicked out the front door but he'll soon be in through the back door if it isn't barred.

If the Greeks had had words for it they would have been translated somewhat as follows: "From overburdening administration comes stereotyped thinking, loss of initiative, and professional stagnation."

W. F. COLEMAN, Colonel, USMC

Tailor Your Own . . .

DEAR SIR:

Maj M. S. Hall seems unduly pessimistic about changing the dungaree jacket and trousers to more svelte lines. He has apparently forgotten the incorrigible ingenuity of the marine for transmuting any article of issued attire to something that he regards as a little smarter than it was originally. The average marine can take the visored cap and by some instantaneous magic give the pancake top a roll that resembles that of a badly built junk. For 25 years he has been cutting down his leggins, taking the color out of his khaki with lye and lime, setting new high collars to the old greens blouse, and radically redesigning his drab cotton shirts till they fit like a coat of tan. I have no hesitation in believing that with a little encouragement he could transform the present dungaree jacket into a pure white dress shirt with ruffles down the bosom.

All that needs to be done is to have the Equipment Board meet and rule that it would be undesirable to have the jacket altered in these specific ways:

1. The removal of two wedge-shaped pieces from either side

seem to make the jacket fit snugly at the waist and around the hips.

- 2. The manufacture or use of cloth belts two and one-half inches wide and made of the same material as the jacket.
 - 3. The use of red chevrons on the sleeves.

Once these orders had been posted and digested, a bland closing of the eyes to violations would produce a complete change in costume within two weeks. The marines would be delighted, and I think Maj Hall would be satisfied.

There are other improvements that could be introduced more gradually. Fair leather belts could be substituted for the cloth belts—if the Major is really worried about the similarity to convict garb, he can make the difference between free men and prisoners immediatey obvious by restoring the old privilege of the soldier—letting him wear side arms on the leather belts. The present bayonet is completely useless by itself as either weapon or tool, but there must be enough of the old "utility and fighting" knives around for issuance. They would be useful as well as ornamental, especially during field exercises.

The cap presents no difficulties. Issue bronze or the tarnished silver emblems to insert above the visor. The marine will promptly give these the necessary touch of brilliance by burnishing the two continents. Take the open gaping of the trouser leg out by using the old devices of the frontiersman or of northern people who live where there are long snows: the ankle tie. Issue the trousers very long; have the marine lift the hem to the shoe top and bind it with a two foot length of tape such as that which sealed the old rolled puttees. The trouser leg would blouse down neatly over the shoetop and would keep out of the mud.

Finally, for an experiment, it might be well to select a good, fast forest-green dye and place bottles or packages of it on the Post Exchange shelves. Just to see what would happen.

ANCIENT ARCADIAN

Gazette Error . . .

DEAR SIR:

Much as I regret it, I am afraid that the GAZETTE laid an egg in certain portions of its paragraph, Marine Aviation at Midway, which appeared on page 41 of last December's issue.

It was VMSB 241, not VMSB 231 (as stated in the GAZETTE) which conducted the Marine dive-bombing strikes during the battle of Midway. Furthermore, according to the most optimistic figures acceptable from a historian's standpoint, Marine Air Group 22 can be credited with approximately 43 enemy aircraft out the of total of 106 fighters and bombers in the attacking force. This is in marked contrast to your statement, "only 12 Jap bombers and fighters broke through to hit the island." As a matter of fact, more than 50 enemy bombers got through to hit Midway at one time or another during the enemy's raid of 4 June 1942. According to the best information, moreover, the only carrier hit by Marine dive bombers was the Akagi, in contrast to your statement that our dive-bombers "scored direct hits on two carriers." Finally,



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a more realistic box-score on the results achieved by Marine aviation at Midway, would substitute for the GAZETTE'S claimed "direct hits on two carriers and two battleships"—"direct hits on one carrier and one heavy cruiser."

None of the foregoing is in any sense a detraction from the extraordinary and couargeous achievements of our aviation on 4-5 June 1942, but overclaims and overglorification are the worst way to spoil a really fine record which can stand proudly on its own feet.

Substantiation of my corrections, as well as detailed information on these and other matters regarding Marine performance at the battle of Midway, will be found in the forthcoming Historical Section narrative, Marines at Midway, publication of which is anticipated within the next few months.

R. D. HEINL, JR Major, USMC

The GAZETTE was in error in its story, The GI Bill and the Regular, which appeared in the February issue. The control dates for the benefits of the GI Bill should have read "anytime between the control dates of 16 September 1940 and 25 July 1947" instead of 16 September 1940 and 25 July 1946.

1 Ckeck List

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
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